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Abstract
This papers contains a survey of the recent literature devoted to the returns to
schooling within a dynamic structural framework. I present a historical perspec-
tive on the evolution of the literature, from early static models set in a selectivity
framework (Willis and Rosen, 1979) to the recent literature, stimulated by Keane
and Wolpin (1997), and which uses stochastic dynamic programming techniques.
After reviewing the literature thoroughly, I compare the structural approach with
the IV (experimental) approach. I present their commonalities and I also discuss
their fundamental differences. To get an order of magnitude, most structural
estimates reported for the US range between 4% and 7% per year. On the other
hand, IV estimates between 10% and 15% per year are often reported. The dis-
crepancy prevails even when comparable (if not identical) data sets are used. The
discussion is focussed on understanding this divergence. The distinction between
static and dynamic model specifications is a recurrent theme in the analysis. I
argue that the distinction between the IV approach and the structural approach
may be coined in terms of a trade off between behavioral and statistical assump-
tions. For this reason, and unless one has very specific knowledge of the true data
generating process, it is neither possible, nor sensible, to claim which approach
to estimation is more flexible. More precisely, I show that structural and IV ap-
proaches differ mainly at the level of i) the compatibility of the underlying models
with truly dynamic behavior, ii) the role of heterogeneity in ability and tastes,
iii) the consideration of post-schooling opportunities, and (iv) the specification
(and interpretation) of the Mincer wage equation.
Key Words: Returns to Schooling, Human Capital, Ability Bias, Dynamic
Programming, Dynamic Self-Selection, Natural experiments, IV estimation.
JEL Classification: J2-J3.
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1 Introduction
The return to schooling is one of the most investigated parameters in modern
economics. It plays a central role in microeconomic models of human capital
accumulation and it is important in the empirical growth literature. The return
to schooling is also at the center of the debate on the recent increase in wage
inequality. At the policy level, increasing the level of education in the population
is generally regarded as a desirable goal and knowing the effect of schooling on
wages or labor market productivity is therefore a major concern to most policy
makers.
Because schooling decisions are potentially affected by unobserved individual
skills and tastes, both of which are also correlated with individual wages, econo-
mists have been reluctant to associate a structural interpretation to the positive
correlation between schooling and wages. Indeed, the sign of the statistical bias
that may occur when measuring the causal effect of schooling on wages by a sim-
ple correlation or by OLS techniques, typically referred to as “ability bias”, has
been the object of much debate over the last 40 years.
In view of the general interest in skill formation policies, it is important to
obtain a measure of the true causal effect of schooling on wages. This objective
has been at the forefront of the empirical labor economics literature for many
years and, most likely, it will continue to be there for some time.
This paper contains a survey of the recent literature in which returns to
schooling are estimated using structural dynamic programming techniques. The
evolution of the structural literature is split into three fundamental stages. The
first stage consists of seminal work on schooling and earnings by Becker (1964)
and Mincer (1958). The second stage, which culminates in Willis and Rosen
(1979), is largely influenced by the econometric self-selection literature (Heckman,
1976). Finally, the recent literature, stimulated by Keane and Wolpin (1997),
uses stochastic dynamic programming techniques, and forms a third stage of the
evolution of the structural literature. It is the focus of this survey.
In order to be consistent with the terminology found in the existing literature,
I use the term “return to schooling” to refer to the causal effect of schooling on
wages, even though it is only partially related to the concept of a rate of return
on an investment; nevertheless, it is widely accepted in labor economics.1 Until
recently, the literature on the return to schooling had been completely dominated
by studies using instrumental variable (IV) techniques or OLS regressions aug-
mented with an observable measure of market ability.2 However, the literature
concerned with human capital accumulation, and based on structural stochastic
1Issues surrounding the distinction between internal rates of return and wage growth rates
are discussed in Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2005).
2In this paper, the expressions “experimental approach” and “IV approach” may be used
interchangeably. The term “experimental” refers to the use of “Natural experiments” and has
little to do with the recent literature on laboratory experiments.
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dynamic programming (SSDP) techniques, has expanded rapidly in the past 10
years. It now offers a different perspective on the issues surrounding the mea-
surement of returns to schooling and it provides a transparent illustration of
several dynamic self-selection issues which are central to the analysis of educa-
tion and skill formation policies. Obviously, the structural and the experimental
approaches to estimation are based on completely different philosophies and are,
at a technical level, fundamentally different.
Aside from these “ideological” differences, there is also a surprising discrep-
ancy between the relatively high estimates of the return to schooling reported in
the IV literature and those, much lower, obtained in a structural framework. To
get an order of magnitude, most structural estimates obtained for the US range
between 4% and 7% per year (Keane and Wolpin, 1997, and Belzil and Hansen,
2002). On the other hand, IV estimates between 10% and 15% per year are of-
ten reported. The discrepancy prevails even when comparable (if not identical)
data sets are used. In general, structural estimates are not only smaller than
IV estimates but also smaller than OLS estimates. For this reason, structural
estimation has revived interest in the notion of “ability bias” and, in particular,
has brought credibility to the classical hypothesis, that the observed correla-
tion between wages and schooling is an over-estimate of the true causal effect of
schooling on wages.
At the outset, and while the focus of this survey is on the estimation of an out-
come equation (more specifically, the return to schooling), it should be clear that
the contribution of the structural approach to human capital accumulation mod-
els is not confined to what is reviewed below. Obviously, the structural approach
identifies parameters which are not identifiable in the experimental literature.
There is a wide range of issues such as the effects of liquidity constraints on
schooling enrollment, risk aversion and schooling decisions, or the effects of coun-
terfactual tuition policy changes that are examined typically within a structural
framework. These topics are interesting in their own right. However, estimates
of the return to schooling are found in both structural and experimental papers.
A comparison is therefore particularly enlightening.3
The distinction between static and dynamic model specifications is a recurrent
theme in the analysis. In what follows, I argue that the distinction between the
IV approach and the structural approach may be coined in terms of a trade off
between behavioral and statistical assumptions. For this reason, and unless one
has a very specific knowledge of the true data generating process, it is neither
possible, nor sensible, to claim which approach to estimation is more flexible.
More precisely, I show that structural and IV approaches differ mainly at the
level of i) the compatibility of the underlying models with truly dynamic behavior,
3Indeed, it is very difficult to find another economic parameter that has been estimated as
intensively as the return to schooling and for which the estimation method is also the object of
such dispute.
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ii) the role of heterogeneity in ability and tastes, iii) the consideration of post-
schooling opportunities, and (iv) the specification (and interpretation) of the
Mincer wage regression.
The paper is made of two fundamental parts. The first part is devoted to the
structural literature itself and comprises the following elements. First, in Section
2, I present a short historical summary of the early literature on schooling and
earnings, which dates back to Becker (1964) and Mincer (1958). In Section 3,
I turn to the first generation of “structural models” of endogenous schooling
decisions which emerged as a special case of the econometric literature on self-
selection (Heckman, 1979). This literature is exemplified in a key contribution
by Willis and Rosen (1979). After reviewing briefly the structure of empirical
dynamic programming models which emerged in the 1980’s in Section 4, I devote
Section 5 to the second generation of structural human capital accumulation
models which focussed on post-schooling investments and assumed that schooling
was pre-determined (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989 and 1995). Subsequently, in the
core of the paper (Section 6), I review a set of papers devoted to the modeling of
schooling decisions in a stochastic dynamic programming setting and stress their
specificities as well as their estimates of the return to schooling. These include
Keane and Wolpin (1997, 2000 and 2001), Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), Belzil
and Hansen (2002 and 2005), Magnac and Thesmar (2002b). In section 7, I
examine three contributions set in a general equilibrium framework (Heckman,
Lochner and Taber, 1998; Lee, 2005; and Lee and Wolpin, 2006).
The second part of this survey is devoted to a comparison of the IV approach
(the most popular approach in empirical labor economics) and the structural
approach. In Section 8, I discuss and analyze their commonalities as well as
their key differences. This leads to Section 9 which is devoted to the potential
reasons why structural and reduced form estimates may be different. Finally,
some avenues for future research are identified in the Conclusion.
2 The Return to Schooling and the Mincer Equa-
tion
The correlation between education and wages has been analyzed in seminal pieces
by Becker (1964, 1967) and Mincer (1958, 1974). At the time, the fundamental
models underlying schooling choices were all based on a lifecycle income maxi-
mization hypothesis. In its simplest form, the early Becker-Mincer model assumes
that individuals maximize lifetime earnings, V (s), by choosing the optimal level
of schooling s, that is
V (s) = w(s)
∫ T
s
exp(−r · t)dt (1)
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where T is the time horizon (it may be finite or infinite), w(s) denotes the earnings
of an individual with a schooling level s, and r is the subjective rate of interest.
At that time, it was customary to assume that individuals choose the optimal
level of schooling without any consideration for post-schooling human capital
accumulation opportunities or, alternatively, that post-schooling wage growth is
exogenous. It was also common to assume, mostly for expository convenience,
that individuals earn nothing while in school. In this framework, the relationship
between wages and schooling is understood as a compensating wage differential,
emerging from individual differences in discount rates.
The first formal representation of the human capital accumulation process as
an intertemporal optimization problem is due to Ben-Porath (1967). Ben-Porath
assumed competitive labor markets and, more precisely, that individuals are paid
their marginal product according to their individual specific level of skills. In his
model, offered wages reflect the spot market value (the rental price) of a unit of
skill multiplied by the total stock of accumulated skills. That is
Wt = Pt ·Kt (2)
where Wt is labor market wage, Pt is the rental price of a skill and Kt represents
the human capital (total number of skills).
A quick glance at equation (2) reveals the inherent identification problem that
underlies any analysis of human capital theory. Both human capital (K) and skill
prices (P ) are fundamentally unobservable. The Mincerian approach assumes
that human capital accumulation (or skill acquisition) is rendered possible by
combining inputs such a time spent in school, time spent in the labor market,
and innate ability.
It is the production function representation of the relationship between accu-
mulated skills (as an output) and education, experience and abilities (as inputs)
that gave rise to the celebrated Mincer wage regression (Mincer, 1974);
logWt = ϕ0 + ϕ1(St) + ϕ2(Expt) + εt (3)
where ϕ1(St) represents the effects of schooling, ϕ2(Expt) represents the effects
of post-schooling human capital accumulation decisions (approximated by expe-
rience) and εt may be seen as an idiosyncratic productivity shock. Note that
ϕ2(Exp) is typically defined for an exogenous post-schooling human capital ac-
cumulation path and assumed to be concave in accumulated years of labor market
experience.
At this stage, there are two important notes to be made. First, in a com-
petitive framework, the parameters of the Mincer equation should be given a
productivity interpretation. Obviously, in markets that have different configu-
rations (search equilibrium, incentive models, etc.), the interpretation must be
modified. Second, in more general (and more realistic) models within which post-
schooling behavior is endogenous, it will be convenient to rethink ϕ2(Expt) as
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containing several endogenous variables.
By the early 1970’s, the estimation of the return to schooling using Mincerian
wage regressions had become one of the most widely analyzed topics in applied
econometrics. In his survey of the earlier literature, Griliches (1977) pointed out
several econometric problems that arise in estimating the returns to schooling
and, in particular, those pertaining to the measurement of both schooling and
ability. Until then, substantial effort had been devoted to the estimation of
the return to schooling with control variables (or proxies thereof) measuring
unobserved ability.4
More interestingly, Griliches recognized that the endogeneity of schooling de-
cisions, virtually ignored until then, was a serious problem which might have
prevented economists from uncovering the true causal effect of education on earn-
ings. At the econometric level, the main issue may be illustrated by the following
simplified version of the Mincerian wage equation,
logWi = β0 + β1 · Schoolingi + ηi (4)
where ηi is unobserved market ability.
Ignoring post-schooling labor market experience, the discrepancy between
OLS and IV estimates is a reflection of the correlation between schooling and
ability ηi and gives rise to the celebrated notion of ability bias. The ability bias
hypothesis was based on the rather intuitive idea that those who are more able
(those endowed with a high value of ηi) are also more likely to be more educated.
That is when cov(Schoolingi, ηi) > 0, the OLS estimate of the return to schooling
is upward bias. However, as pointed out by Griliches, those individuals endowed
with higher market ability also face a higher opportunity cost of attending school.
For this reason, a negative correlation between schooling and ability (a negative
ability bias) is also conceivable. Perhaps at a more fundamental level, (4) does
not account for the possible existence of multiple skills and, in particular, ignores
the importance of comparative advantages in the labor market. Nevertheless, the
points raised by Griliches stimulated a large number of empirical studies aimed
at tackling the endogeneity of schooling.5
4For instance, in the National Longitudinal survey of Youth (NLSY), some individuals were
administered the Armed Force Qualification Tests (AFQT), which is a test that measures basic
quantitative and analytical skills.
5Technically speaking, the term “endogeneity” used in the empirical literature abuses the
true meaning of endogeneity. In cross-section data, wages are usually measured much beyond
the time when schooling is completed. Because returning to school is rarely observed, schooling
may therefore be viewed as pre-determined. It is only the correlation between schooling and
unobserved skills that is problematic.
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3 Static Models of Schooling and Employment
In the second half of the 1970’s, the endogeneity of schooling was widely accepted.
As is the case for all econometric models plagued with endogenous variables, there
are two alternative approaches to estimating the return to schooling. One branch
of the literature, now known as the “Experimental” literature, adopted as its fun-
damental paradigm the reliance on exogenous variables that are correlated with
schooling but uncorrelated with the error term of the wage equation. Ultimately,
the analyst “instruments out” schooling so to obtain independent variation.6
A second approach, more in line with economic theory, consists of modeling
schooling decisions jointly with wage outcomes. In order to achieve this, the
econometrician must build a model in which both the causal and the spurious
effects of education on wages are separately identifiable. In modern econometric
jargon, this approach is referred to as “structural”. At that time, economists
developed a first vintage of “structural” models of schooling and earnings in which
the utility equations were ad hoc approximations of the maximization problem
faced by the agent. In modern terminology, it is probably more accurate to
refer to this stream of the literature, which I will be discussing now, as “semi-
structural”.7 Despite its intertemporal aspect, the lifetime earnings maximization
paradigm behind most studies was inherently static. That is, economists paid
no attention to modeling optimal post-schooling investments and ignored the
description of the law of motion that maps current schooling choices into future
opportunities.
3.1 The Self-Selection Literature
To a large extent, the new (semi-) structural literature on schooling and earnings
was largely an offshoot of the contemporaneous progress in computational facili-
ties and also relied on some important results in the econometrics of self-selection
models (Heckman, 1979). The key contribution of the self-selection literature
was to provide a statistical framework (based on economic theory) to analyze
samples in which the observability of each individual unit was governed by that
individual’s decision (for example, a sample of college graduates).
The self-selection literature on schooling was also fundamentally static and
focused on the decision to attend college. At the time, it was already recognized
that measuring the return to education was complicated by self-selection. Ob-
viously, the fact that individuals with very low wages (typically with low levels
of schooling) are underrepresented in a standard cross-section survey of the la-
6As we will see later, a wide range of empirical papers using instrumental variable (IV)
techniques have been published since then.
7In the econometrics literature, the term “structural” is widely used, but often designates
different modeling strategies. Further, there seems to be no formal definition of the term
“semi-structural”.
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bor force participants, implies that the correlation between wages and schooling
may diverged from the true one.8 Furthermore, many researchers questioned the
validity of the (positive) ability bias and pointed out its superficial content.
The literature of the late 70’s constitutes a first step toward the comprehension
of the selectivity process that governs skill acquisition and schooling decisions.
Many contributions may be imbedded in the model of comparative advantage de-
veloped by Roy (1951). Consider an individual contemplating college attendance.
That individual is endowed with the following wage equations:
log Wi,hs = Xiβhs + εi,hs (5)
log Wi,c = Xiβc + εi,c (6)
where Wi,hs is the wage if the individual stops after high-school graduation and
Wi,c is the potential wage as a college graduate. The error terms εi,hs and εi,c
represent unobserved abilities in jobs requiring high school training and college
training respectively and Xi is a vector of individual characteristics. The optimal
decision is represented by the following latent structural equation
S∗i = ZiβS + εi,S (7)
where Si = 1 when S
∗
i > 0 and 0 if not. In most related applications, it is
assumed that εi,hs, εi,c and εi,S follow a multi-variate normal distribution and the
vector Zi contains all elements of Xi plus other regressors that would affect the
discount rate (say parental income).9
The self-selection model, as applied to the schooling decision process, was a
major advance. In particular, it allowed labor economists to rethink the return to
schooling within a framework that no longer views it as a single parameter. This
is readily seen upon comparing (5) and (6) with (4). For a randomly selected
individual, the return to schooling is the difference between (6) and (5) and it is
affected both by observed and unobserved heterogeneity. In a simpler framework
such as (4), it is only a single parameter.
3.2 Willis and Rosen (1979): Education and Self-Selection
The semi-structural approach is exemplified by Willis and Rosen (1979), who
extend the Roy model to incorporate an exogenous individual/occupation-specific
growth rate. Willis and Rosen start with a model of life time earnings, denoted
Yij, where i is the individual subscript and j is the education level achieved by
8In this specific case, the OLS estimate of the effect of schooling would under-estimate the
true return to schooling and the bias is contrary to the standard “Ability Bias”. See the Nobel
Prize Public Report on James J. Heckman and Daniel L. McFadden (2000).
9Nowadays, the parametric estimation of a system of equations such as (5), (6) and (7), has
become highly controversial.
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the individual (either high school or college). Willis and Rosen were the first to
model schooling decisions in a non-hierarchical structure which allow explicitly
for the existence of comparative advantages.
They assume that
Yij = Y¯ij · exp(gij · Xi) (8)
where Y¯ij is initial earnings and gij is individual i’s earnings growth under regime
j. The authors assume that both the initial earnings function and the growth
rate are represented by a linear equation:
Yij = βj ·Xi + U
Y
ij for j = 1, 2 (9)
and
gij = δj · Xi + U
g
ij for j = 1, 2 (10)
where UYij , U
g
ij are individual specific error terms representing cross-sectional het-
erogeneity.
The optimal schooling decision is obtained by assuming that individuals max-
imize lifetime earnings and that each individual is endowed with a subjective
discount rate, ri, given by the following equation
ri = Zi · δ + Uir (11)
where the vector Zi contains regressors that would affect the discount rate (say
parental income). Willis and Rosen assumed UYij , U
g
ij and U
r
i to be jointly normal.
The schooling decision equation is a latent (single) index equation, like (7), which
follows from the lifecycle income maximization hypothesis.
Willis and Rosen estimated their model on a sample of World War II veterans.
They found evidence in favor of comparative advantages (positive sorting). That
is individuals who go to college have higher lifetime earnings in jobs requiring
college than those who did not, and also find that those who did not enroll
in college have higher life time earnings in jobs requiring high school training
than those who enrolled in college, had they decided to work in high school type
occupations. They also find that Mathematics test scores significantly increase
the earnings of college educated workers but have no effect on earnings of high
school graduates.
Willis and Rosen’s contribution was remarkable in many respects, but in
particular, it pointed out that in the presence of multiple skills (two skills in this
specific instance), the notion of ability bias was much more complex than in a
single skill (hierarchical) representation. In particular, when cov(εi,hs, εi,c) < 0,
individuals who self-select into low skill jobs may achieve higher lifetime earnings
than they would have if they had chosen to attend college. However, as does
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all the literature based on self-selection models, their analysis was plagued by
the difficulty to infer counterfactual choices. For this reason, they could not
obtain an estimate of the covariance between εi,hs and εi,c. Nowadays, identifying
correlations between unobservables that generate counterfactual outcomes is still
a major challenge.10
4 Estimable Stochastic Discrete Dynamic Pro-
gramming Models
In this section, I present the general structure of stochastic dynamic discrete
programming models. The models surveyed in Sections 5, 6 and 7 belong to the
general class of SSDP models which I will now briefly describe. The reader who
is familiar with the details of structural estimation in a dynamic framework, may
skip this section and go directly to Section 5.
4.1 The General Structure
To a large extent, the development of dynamic macroeconomic theory that took
place in the 1970’s stimulated interest in the estimation of dynamic microeco-
nomic models in the 1980’s. As more and more economists became familiar with
stochastic dynamic programming techniques, and with regular improvements in
computer power, the development of empirical methods for the estimation of
dynamic discrete choice models was inevitable. The introduction of recursive
methods in stochastic economics is typically associated with (Bellman, 1957),
although the first known example of modern dynamic programming is found in
Masse´ (1946).11 Nowadays, stochastic dynamic programming belongs to the stan-
dard toolkit necessary to the completion of graduate training in economics. This
is largely due to the revolution in macroeconomics initiated by the work of Robert
Lucas.12
At a first stage, econometricians estimated relatively simple discrete dynamic
programming models such as optimal stopping models but they gradually moved
to models with a relatively high number of choices (Rust, 1987; Pakes, 1986; and
Wolpin, 1984).
Structural stochastic dynamic programming models are based on the funda-
mental idea that agents are forward looking. In the structural approach, the
10The recent contribution by Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003) constitutes a major
breakthrough in the field.
11This was actually pointed out to me by the late Gerard Debreu. I would also like to thank
Kenneth Arrow for providing me with some details on Pierre Masse´.
12Classical references on dynamic programming include Bellman (1957), Whittle (1982) and
Stokey, Lucas and Presscott (1989).
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estimated parameters are also those used to solve the agent’s optimization prob-
lem and therefore provide a clearer connection between economic theory and the
data than do IV or reduced-form estimates. The implementation of a structural
model therefore requires two fundamental steps; the solution of the dynamic pro-
gramming problem (for a given set of parameters) and an iterative optimization
procedure over the relevant parameter space in order to maximize an objective
function (or minimize a distance).13
Consider an individual facing k = 1, 2..., K possible actions and maximizing
the expected discounted lifetime utility over a finite horizon going from t =
s, s+1, ...T . Define the set containing all state variables known by the agent at t
as Ωt. Lifetime utility is assumed to be time separable and the per-period utility
of choosing option k, Uk(t), may depend on the choice (subscript k) made by the
individual at time t or it may depend on t explicitly. In general, Uk(t) depends
on Ωt but I suppress the dependence to simplify notation The control variable is
dkt = 1 when k is chosen and 0 if not and β is the discount factor. The optimal
value function (Bellman, 1957) is
Vt(Ωt) = MaxdktE[
T∑
s=t
βs−t · (
K∑
k=1
Uk(s) · dks) | Ωt) (12)
As is standard in the literature, assume that Ωt contains a vector of state
specific random shocks (εtk for k = 1, 2 K) and that these εtk’s are known when
the decision is made (at the beginning of period t) but that the future values
are unknown (although their distribution is known). As structural models are
typically based on the Rational Expectation hypothesis, there is no distinction
to be made between subjective and objective probability distributions.
In many applications, the per-period utility, Uk(t), is additively separable with
respect to the random shock. If so, it is the sum of a deterministic component,
U¯k(t), and a state specific utility shock, εtk, and the state specific value function
is then written as
Vkt(Ωt) = U¯k(t) + εtk + βE max{V1,t+1(Ωt+1), ..VK,t+1(Ωt+1) | dkt = 1}
or, more compactly, as
Vkt(Ωt) = U¯k(t) + εtk + βEVt+1(Ωt+1 | dkt = 1)
Relaxing additive separability is possible, but it may entail additional com-
putational problems.
13Within a structural framework, it is also easy to simulate counterfactual policy experi-
ments and therefore to evaluate relevant policies. Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and Rust (1997)
present comprehensive surveys of this literature as well as the solution and estimation tech-
niques involved.
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The dynamics are contained in the parametric relationship (denoted t(.)),
which maps current choices (dkt) and current state variables (Ωt) onto future
state variables (Ωt+1), namely
Ωt+1 = t(Ωt, dkt) (13)
and where t(.) is a distribution function. The Markovian property of (13) may
also be relaxed, but only at relatively high computational cost. The expected
value in (12) is taken with respect to the future ε′kts. The order of causation is
therefore
Ωs → dks → Ω(s + 1) → dks+1 → ...Ω(T ) → dkT (14)
In many schooling models where individuals maximize lifetime earnings, the Min-
cer wage equation is at the same time part of the law of motion and a key element
of the per-period utility of working. In words, (13) implies that the wage offered
at the beginning of period t+1 (which is one element of Ωt+1) is a stochastic
function of both the accumulated level of human capital at the beginning of the
previous period (schooling and post-schooling human capital accumulated by the
beginning of t) and the choice made last period (whether one worked or attended
school in t).
The dynamic discrete choice model (when incorporating a large number of
options), is general enough to incorporate schooling, on-the-job training, labor
supply, or even job search efforts. So, from now on, we think of the Mincer
equation as follows:
logWt = ϕ0 + ϕ1(
t∑
j=1
dk=S,j) + ϕ2(
t∑
j=1
dk =S,j) + εt (15)
where S is the index that identifies schooling as the actual choice exercised in
period t.
4.2 Dynamic Self-Selection
Dynamic self-selection may be introduced by assuming that
Uik(t) = U¯k(t, ωik) + ε
k
it (16)
where ωik is a time invariant individual-specific taste for choice k, and/or by
specifying an individual specific law of motion:
Ωi,t+1 = it(Ωit, di,k,t, ηi) (17)
where ηi is an individual specific effect which influences labor market outcomes.
The vector {ω¯ki , ηi} is a representation of the individual specific initial endow-
ments in taste and abilities existing before the start of the human capital accu-
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mulation process. These are permanent and cannot be observed by the econome-
trician, but are assumed to be known by the agent. This amounts to an extreme
form of Rational Expectation.
In the context of a schooling decision problem, ωik may play the role of un-
observed taste for schooling, ηi could be labor market ability, and it would rep-
resent the Mincer wage equation. It will be convenient to assume that {ω¯ki , ηi}
are jointly distributed with distribution function G(.) Note that the introduction
of {ω¯ki , ηi} into the analysis involves some ad-hoc decisions. In the example of
the Mincerian wage equation, ηi may affect log wages additively or it may affect
slopes as well. The former approach is in line with the recent microeconometric
literature on treatment effect.14
4.3 Identification
In the econometric literature, non-parametric identification results are well known
for certain types of reduced-form dynamic models such as Proportional Hazards.
In the structural literature, identification is typically considered within a par-
ticular parametric structure. As of now, the common view is that structural
models require to specify preferences and technology and therefore imply func-
tional forms and parametric assumptions. The degree of under-identification
(non-parametric) is analyzed precisely in Hotz and Miller (1993), Rust (1994)
and Magnac and Thesmar (2002) although all of them consider the identification
of generic models in which data on outcomes are ignored.
To see the issue, it is convenient to examine the representability theorems
introduced in Hotz and Miller (1993) and developed further in Magnac and Thes-
mar (2002).
Dropping the time subscript, define the vector of choice probabilities P¯ as
P¯ = {Pr(d1 = 1),Pr(d2 = 1), ...Pr(dK = 1)}
and the vector V¯ containing the non-stochastic parts of the value functions as
V¯ = V¯1, V¯2, ...V¯K
where
V¯k = U¯k(.) + βEV
It may be shown that, given some normalizations, there exists a one-to-one rela-
tionship between value functions and choice probabilities; that is
V¯k = V¯K + qk(P¯ ;G(.)) (18)
14This approach is followed in Belzil and Hansen (2006) as well as in Cohen-Goldner and
Eckstein (2002 and 2005).
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where G(.) is the distribution of the ε′ks and where qk(.) is a function mapping
P¯ onto V¯k, and which is determined by G(.).
Basically, (18) states that given a reference choice (V¯K), the value functions are
invertible in choice probabilities. However, invertability requires the specification
of the distribution function G(.) and therefore implies that there exists a function
φ(.) such that
V¯1, V¯2, ...V¯K−1 = φ(P¯ ; V¯K) (19)
Unless some additional restrictions are considered, equation (19) implies that
estimation of the parameters of dynamic programming models which use data on
discrete choices only requires (i) a specification of the error shock (G(.)), (ii) a
reference choice and, (iii) setting the discount rate.15
As the structure of each model is specific, it is impossible to give a general
recipe for identification. For instance, in many examples reviewed below, in-
dividuals are assumed to maximize earnings (Keane and Wolpin, 1997) or the
logarithm of earnings (Belzil and Hansen, 2002). Along with some terminal value
conditions, these assumptions imply that the utility of labor market work may
be inferred from data on labor market outcomes and that estimations of the
parameters for all K options may be performed.
Most empirical papers devoted to human capital use data on choices (school-
ing and employment) and panel data on labor market outcomes (mostly wages
and employment outcomes). The use of panel data is not innocuous. In many
applications, the correlation between ω¯ki and ηi becomes a key element of the
model. In many papers where identification is discussed informally (Keane and
Wolpin, 1997, Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999, and Belzil and Hansen, 2002), data on
post-schooling outcomes is typically mentioned as playing an important role in
the identification of some of the parameters of the model, and especially, the cor-
relation between unobserved tastes for specific choices and labor market outcomes
(wages).
Estimation is usually performed using maximum likelihood techniques or their
simulated counterparts. In most of the cases, this requires solving a number of
moment conditions equal to the number of parameters. Obviously, estimation
requires identifiability of the particular parametric structure. Typically, as with
the most complicated identifiable non-linear models, structural models are locally
identified. However, in the case where a specific model is estimated at a low
computation time cost, it is sometimes possible to search a larger parameter
space for other local maxima.
Finally, it should be noted that the identification results stated earlier ignore
conditions that may be imposed on utility functions such as those used in the
15This argument applies to non-parametric identification. The discount factor may still be
estimated, given (parametric) identifiability. Indeed, in many studies, it is estimated (not
fixed).
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static discrete choice literature. Indeed, in recent work, Heckman and Navarro
(2006) have developed a set of assumptions in which it is conceivable to identify
a dynamic discrete choice model semi-parametrically. Their results imply that,
under certain conditions, estimation of a structural model does not require a
parametric distribution for the error shocks.16 The identification proof is largely
influenced by results circulated in the static discrete choice literature (Matzkin,
1994, 2004) and also uses “identification in the limit” arguments. Data on out-
comes also play a specific role in the identification proof, which relies heavily
on factor structure representations discussed in Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman
(2003) .
4.4 Estimation
Using recursive techniques, estimation of the parameters of Uk(.), t, and po-
tentially β, may be achieved by various method-of-moment estimators (including
maximum likelihood). The fundamental input required at the estimation step
is an expression for the probabilistic choice of option k. In general terms, the
probability that option k is chosen is simply
Pr(dkt = 1) = Pr{Ukt(.) + βEVt+1(. | dkt = 1) ≥
Ust(.) + βEVt+1(. | dst = 1)} for all s 	= k (20)
In the case where Ukt() is linear in the ε
′
tks, this expression takes the form of
a non-linear discrete choice equation and boils down to the probability that the
εkt exceeds a threshold value.
However, even in such a case, technical difficulties arise in the evaluation of
the EVt+1(.). When the model is set in a finite horizon framework, the solution
method will be based on recursive techniques (Bellman, 1957). In general, no
explicit expression exists for EVt+1(.), and numerical methods need to be used,
but, in specific cases, an analytical form may be available.17
Basically, the estimation step requires forming the joint probability of the
individual specific choices and market wages (when observed) over the life cycle.
For a given individual i, the joint probability is the product of all period specific
probabilities; that is
16Their argumentation is developed in the context of an optimal stopping problem.
17There is indeed a relatively large literature devoted to solution methods. For a discussion,
see Rust (1997), Keane and Wolpin (1994), Hotz and Miller (1993) and Eckstein and Wolpin
(1989,b). Analytical form solutions may exist when the number of states is limited such as in
optimal stopping models or when the random terms follow an extreme value distribution (Rust,
1987).
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Pr{(dik1, wi1), ...(dikT , wiT )} = Pr(dik1, wi1) · .....Pr(dikT , wiT ) (21)
where the particular form of Pr(dikt, wit) will differ according to the specificity of
the model considered.
In virtually all models allowing for permanent unobserved heterogeneity, it is
assumed that individual unobserved (to the econometrician) skills are fully known
by the optimizing agent.18 This implies forming the following mixed likelihood
function:
L(.) =
∫
ΠTt=1 Pr(dkt,Wt | ω¯
k
i , ηi)dG(ω¯
k
i , ηi) (22)
where θ(.) is a set of parameters to be estimated. In practice, (22) is maximized
with respect to a discrete approximation of G(.) with a known, fixed, number,
say M , of types. This means that each type is endowed with a specific vector
of endowments (ω¯km, ηm) and the integral is then replaced by a discrete sum such
as; 19
L(.) =
M∑
m=1
ΠTt=1 Pr(dkt,Wt | type m).Pr(type m) (23)
where Pr(type m) refers to the population proportion of individuals belonging to
a particular type m.
5 Dynamic Labor Supply with Pre-determined
Schooling
Until the second half of the 80’s, the literature on schooling was mostly confined
to static models estimated from cross-sectional data. At the same time, and as
mentioned previously, the earlier structural dynamic microeconometric models of
the labor market did not focus on human capital per se. In the early 80’s, many
countries experienced high unemployment rates, and several labor economists
paid particular attention to the search behavior of the unemployed within an
optimal stopping framework. At a technical level, optimal job search behavior is
the simplest dynamic programming model that can be estimated, but it may also
be regarded as one of the most relevant forms of post-schooling human capital
investment.20
18However, in the case where post schooling outcomes are modeled within a search-matching
framework (such as in Eckstein and Wolpin, 1995), match-specific productivity is not known
ex-ante.
19This approach is in the spirit of Heckman and Singer (1984).
20More precisely, while search activities may not enhance productivity, they allow individuals
to maximize post schooling wage growth. For this reason, search activities may be regarded
as a particular form of human capital investment. See Flinn and Heckman (1982) for a classic
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Because computation time was still a major constraint by the end of the
80’s, those who investigated post schooling investments (labor supply, experience
accumulation or search behavior) treated schooling as predetermined. In terms
of equation (12), this implies that most researchers set s at the time of labor
market entrance and include schooling achievements in Ωs. I now review two
of these contributions; Eckstein and Wolpin (1989, 1995), hereafter EW(89) and
EW(95).
5.1 Eckstein and Wolpin (1989): Dynamic Labor Force
Participation
Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) estimate a structural dynamic model of labor force
participation of married women which embodies intertemporal substitution through
preferences and constraints. Their model analyzes time allocation between 2 op-
tions, work and leisure (or home production), from age 45 until retirement. The
law of motion is a Mincer equation with endogenous work experience.
The utility function is linear and additive in consumption so the authors may
disregard borrowing and saving behavior. However, as the utility function is
not intertemporally separable, it is consistent with the existence of a diminishing
marginal utility of leisure (non-market time) or habit persistence. In their model,
women experience a disutility of work but also take into account that accumu-
lated experience raises future wages. Both fertility and schooling are exogenous.
Current labor force participation affects future wages which itself affects future
labor force participation. EW do not consider unobserved heterogeneity in mar-
ket ability but focus on selectivity issues arising in the presence of heterogeneous
tastes (or distastes) for work (unobserved heterogeneity is introduced as an in-
tercept term in the instantaneous utility of work). The model is estimated using
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of mature women (they restrict at-
tention to those who were between 39 and 44 years old in 1967). This avoids
modeling childbearing decisions.
The results indicate that labor market participation reduces total utility and
that the disutility of work increases with schooling. As well, the disutility of
work rises with accumulated experience. The return to schooling is estimated to
be 0.05 while the return to experience and its square are found to be 0.024 and
-0.0002 respectively. Interestingly, the authors also investigate how taking into
account unobserved heterogeneity may affect the return to experience. When
the authors re-estimate their model with an individual specific unobserved taste
for work (fixed effect), the return to experience is diminished slightly but state
dependence remains important.
EW (89) is an important paper in the literature. It is the first structural
dynamic programming model of human capital accumulation set in a Mincerian
example. The literature is surveyed in Eckstein and van den Berg, 2005.
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framework and estimated from micro-data. This is also the first example of the
use of structural estimation in order to correct for heterogeneity bias, although it
does not appear to be one of the main objectives of the paper. There is therefore
a similarity between the paper and the earlier literature on employment and
self-selection (Heckman, 1979).
5.2 Eckstein andWolpin (1995): The Return to Schooling
in a Search/Matching Model
Eckstein and Wolpin (1995) are the first authors to attempt to estimate returns
to schooling within a search framework.21 However, the authors depart from the
standard partial equilibrium search framework and estimate a search/bargaining
model in the spirit of Diamond and Maskin (1979). In their model, education
is exogenously determined. They assume that firms and workers meet randomly
(given a level of effort endogenously determined by both firm and worker) and
sample one observation from a “match” distribution. The optimal decision rule
is to search until a match value exceeding a reservation level is actually drawn.
Using data on the duration to first job and accepted wages, and imposing further
restrictions on the solution to the bargaining problem, the authors are able to
recover some key parameters.22
The use data from the 1979 youth cohort of the NLSY. They perform sep-
arate estimation for blacks and whites, and distinguish between four schooling
levels: high-school non-completers, high school graduates, college non-completers
and college graduates. It is important to note that the return to schooling is es-
timated from data on the first job only. EW distinguish between offered wages
and accepted wages when estimating the return to schooling. They argue that
observed differences in mean accepted wages provide a distorted picture of the
return to schooling since not all the firm-worker matches are accepted. Offered
wages, on the other hand, are more dependent on market fundamentals (produc-
tivity, discrimination,etc.). To illustrate this, EW show the discrepancy between
the returns to schooling measured from observed wages and those obtained from
offered wages, in their sample, the differentials in mean accepted wages by school-
ing level ranges between 7% and 26%. Mean accepted wages are much higher than
mean offered wages. EW compute internal rates of return to schooling (the inter-
est rate that equates the present value of the constant streams of offered wages
for each incremental schooling level) on both accepted and offered wages. In
general, those computed with offered wages (ranging from 6% to 27% for white
males) are higher than those computed with accepted wages (ranging from 5 %
21Wolpin (1992) studies the transition from high school to full time employment during the
first five years following graduation and focuses on racial differences in job search outcomes.
As he does not report estimates of the returns to schooling, it is not surveyed here.
22More precisely, in order to fit the model, they impose a symmetry condition on firm/worker
solutions.
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to 12%). These differences illustrate the impact of the reservation wage on the
return to schooling measured from potential (offered) wages as opposed to the
return measured from accepted (observed) wages.
Again, it is possible to draw a parallel between Eckstein and Wolpin’s con-
tribution and the early self-selection literature discussed in Section 3.1. Just as
the under-representation of low wage workers in a standard cross-section survey
of labor force participants is likely to affect estimates of the effect of schooling
on market productivity, so the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in search
costs (and reservation wages) and the existence of search frictions is likely to dis-
tort the correlation between true labor market productivity and schooling, when
inference rests solely on accepted wages. The distinction between offered and
accepted wages has not received much attention either in the structural or the
experimental literature. As we now enter the next section focussing on the recent
structural dynamic programming literature devoted to endogenous schooling, we
will see that virtually all models are set in a competitive framework. This will
imply an automatic correspondence between observed wage growth and human
capital enhancement.
6 Dynamic Models of Schooling and Employ-
ment Choices
In the 1990’s, applied econometricians started to implement dynamic discrete
choice models of schooling decisions within a fully structural framework. The de-
velopment of econometric techniques for the estimation of dynamic programming
models allowed economists to re-think the Becker-Mincer paradigm of human cap-
ital accumulation in a framework where schooling was treated truly as a discrete
choice and where uncertainty played a key role. After all, the dynamic program-
ming representation of the human capital accumulation process obviously embeds
the Becker-Mincer model as a special case.
Most of the contributions discussed below allow for a broad set of options
which, in all cases, incorporate the decision to attend school, but also other deci-
sions such as employment/occupation choices, savings decisions, the decision to
work while in school. In virtually all cases, the law of motion incorporates a stan-
dard Mincer equation plus other additional features depending on the structure
of the model. Finally, most contributions are characterized by a rich heterogene-
ity specification and reserve an important role for dynamic self-selection. To a
large extent, most of these contributions may be seen as extensions of Willis and
Rosen’s static schooling decision model.
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6.1 Keane and Wolpin (1997): Life Cycle Schooling and
Occupation Choices
Keane and Wolpin (1997) constitutes a seminal piece in the literature. The
authors estimate a structural dynamic programming model of schooling, home
production and occupational choices (blue collar, white collar and military occu-
pations). The model is applied to a sample of young males taken from the 1979
cohort of the NLSY. The model is original in many dimensions. First, it is set
in a multiple skill framework where the different skills are defined by occupation
types (blue collar, white collar and military occupations). Second, experience
accumulation is endogenous; that is, individuals choose to work or not and the
type of work experience to accumulate. The authors estimate occupation spe-
cific returns to schooling, in a context where both schooling and occupation are
endogenous. This is a major achievement.
To put the paper in perspective, it is useful to consider the form of the Min-
cerian regression function. It is given by the following expression
logWimt = ϕm1 · Sit + ϕ21 · Expimt + ϕ22 · Exp
2
imt + ηim (24)
where m is the occupation indicator. It is important to note that accumulated
experience in each different occupation affects the mean wage offer in every occu-
pation. The term ηim refers to individual i’s occupation-specific unobserved skills
by age 16. The regression function therefore allows for heterogeneity in slopes,
although the heterogeneity is only allowed though specific occupations.
Keane and Wolpin postulate that the per-period utility of attending school
is additive in the stochastic error term and assume that the per-period utility
of work is the wage rate.23 The utility of attending school is denominated in
the monetary equivalent. There exist no closed-form solution to the value func-
tions. Repeated numerical solutions of the value functions must therefore be used.
Given the complexity, KW develop an approximation method which is based on
interpolation methods which use simple OLS regression techniques.
Basically, their approach is the following. Select a subset of all possible ele-
ments of the state space in the last period. Given these elements, it is straight-
forward to compute the relevant Emax(.) function using simulation methods
applicable to static discrete choice.24 For those elements at which the Emax(.)
is not evaluated, use an OLS regression of the simulated Emax()”s on the state
space elements, and use a predicted value (an interpolation). As a second step,
go to the previous period and select a new set of points in the state space. Using
simulation methods compute the Emax(.) for the current period. To do this,
KW need the future components of the choice specific utilities. These compo-
nents were either computed by simulation methods at the first step, or they may
23This means that the utility of work is not additive in the wage error shock.
24They actually use the GHK (Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane) simulator.
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be approximated using the interpolation technique. The algorithm is repeated
until the initial period (age 16).25 Furthermore, in the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity, this procedure must be replicated a number of times equal to the
number of types considered in the analysis.
Keane and Wolpin consider a rich heterogeneity specification. The utility of
attending school is assumed to be affected by an individual-specific unobserved
heterogeneity term as well as age and grade-level specific costs. This heterogeneity
term is allowed to be correlated with occupation-specific skills appearing in (22).
It is also assumed that the population distribution is approximated by a discrete
distribution with a (known) fixed number of types which is set to four. As they
model choices from age 16 onward, they must condition on observed differences
in schooling attainment and let the type probabilities depend on schooling.26
Given the allowance for endogenous occupation choices, it is possible to view
the correlation between various skills and schooling attainment as a source of
occupation specific ability bias. Basically, the correlation between individual,
occupation-specific skills and the utility of attending school will dictate whether
those who are more able (at one occupation) will achieve a higher level of school-
ing. Because the wage regression is linear in unobserved skills, the model analyzed
by the authors is compatible with the existence of negative, as well as positive
ability bias.
Keane and Wolpin find that white collar skills are the most strongly corre-
lated (positively) with taste for schooling. While they do not report correlations
between skills, this may be inferred from the type specific rank for each hetero-
geneity component. Indeed, the type specific rank for white collar skills and taste
for schooling are exactly coincident. 27 Interestingly, individual endowments ex-
plain more than 80% of the variance of lifetime wealth.
In their preferred specification, the returns to schooling are found to be 0.070
for white collar occupation, 0.024 for blue collar occupation and 0.058 for military
occupations. Obviously, there are no comparable results in the IV literature
but, when averaged over all types, these returns are low. This is especially
true when compared to OLS estimates of the return to schooling applied to
different waves of the NLSY, which range between 0.09 and 0.11. Interestingly,
KW also considered potential non-linearities (introducing high-school and college
graduation dummies), but report those to be unimportant.
The contribution of Keane and Wolpin is remarkable in many respects. In-
deed, it is most probably the most important contribution to the empirical school-
ing literature since Willis and Rosen (1979). It is the first structural paper that
stresses that there is no such thing as a single return to schooling and to find
relatively low returns to schooling (compared to the IV literature). This is espe-
25This is discussed in detail in Keane and Wolpin (1994).
26This is a way to take into account the endogenous initial conditions.
27This is found in Table 9, page 502.
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cially true for blue collar occupations. Perhaps more importantly, KW are the
first to estimate the importance of persistent individual endowments in explaining
schooling attainment and to provide a formal variance decomposition of lifetime
utility (or earnings) in terms of individual skill endowments (at age 16) and ac-
cumulated human capital. Indeed, the fact that individual endowments explain
so much of the variance of lifetime wealth also implies that college attendance
subsidies would be ineffective as a mean to reduce life cycle inequality.
6.2 Keane andWolpin (2000): Racial Differences inWages
and Schooling Attainments
In their 2000 paper, KW investigate the black/white differential in schooling
attainments and show that the schooling/occupation choice model may also be
used to fit the behavior of young black males. As the model is structured like
KW(97), there is no need to describe it any further. The model is fitted on a
sample of black and white males taken from the NLSY 79. Basically, the authors
find that by allowing for different skill endowments at age 16 (allowing for different
type proportions) and for different skill rental prices for blacks and whites (a racial
indicator binary variable in the Mincer wage function), their model is capable
of explaining schooling attainments of young blacks. The return to schooling
in blue collar occupations (0.020) and white collar occupations (0.071) are quite
comparable to those reported in their 1997 paper. They conclude that differences
in initial endowments along with racial discrimination can explain the relatively
low schooling attainments of blacks and that there is no evidence that young
blacks fail to behave as forward looking agents. An interesting result is that
when discount rates are estimated separately for blacks and whites, they are
quite similar (around 0.93 per year).
6.3 Keane andWolpin (2001): The Role of Parental Trans-
fers and Liquidity Constraints in Schooling Decisions
In Keane and Wolpin (2001), the authors investigate the extent to which differ-
ences in parental transfers account for the positive intergenerational correlation
in educational attainment. In their model, young individuals make decisions
about school attendance, work participation and consumption. They allow for
the possibility of part-time activities in work and college attendance. Estimation
is performed using data on schooling, wages, assets, work, parental co-residence
and parental education.
In their model, the intergenerational education correlation is potentially ex-
plained by several mechanisms. First, individuals endowments at age 16 are
potentially correlated with parents’ education. Second, parents provide financial
transfers to young individuals, according to an exogenous rule which depends on
23
school attendance. The model also assumes that net assets must exceed a lower
bound and that the lower bound is more binding as assets approaches 0. The
model therefore allows for the critical importance of parental transfers.
While the focus of the paper is obviously not on the return to schooling, the
key findings still have implications for the return to schooling. The return to
schooling is found to be 0.075. As we will see later, those individuals estimating
the return to schooling by IV techniques often justify their high returns to school-
ing by the fact that there may be a substantial sub-population of individuals who
have relatively high returns to schooling but cannot attend because of liquidity
constraints. However, Keane and Wolpin find that the return to schooling is still
relatively low when allowing for liquidity constraints; but liquidity constraints
appear to play no role. This finding is also consistent with results reported in
Cameron and Taber (2004), in which the authors investigate the presence of
borrowing constraints using structural methods as well as IV techniques.28
6.4 Belzil and Hansen (2002): The Convexity of theWage-
Schooling Relationship and the Ability Bias
Belzil and Hansen (2002) use a dynamic programming model to investigate the
shape of the wage schooling relationship and evaluate ability bias as defined by
the correlation between schooling achievement and the individual-specific inter-
cept term of the wage equation. There are three states; schooling, labor market
work, and an intermittent state capturing the fact that the schooling acquisition
process is not necessarily continuous. As the objective is to obtain structural
estimates comparable with those reported in the IV literature, there is no dis-
tinction between occupation and sectors. The model may therefore be viewed as
a single skill model.
The model is implemented on a panel of white males taken from the NLSY
covering the years 1979 to 1990. The sample appears to be quite close to the one
analyzed in Keane and Wolpin. The Mincerian wage function is specified as
log Wit = ϕ1(Sit) + ϕ21 · Expit + ϕ22 · Exp
2
it + ηi (25)
where ϕ1(.) is left unspecified and is estimated flexibly with spline techniques.
Local returns are allowed to differ from grade level 8 to 17.29
The utility of attending school is parameterized in a function of parents’ back-
ground variables (father and mother’s education, family income, number of sib-
lings, regional dummies and family status indicating whether the individual was
28One of the tests proposed in Cameron and Taber (2004), is to compare returns to schooling
obtained using instruments affecting opportunity costs with returns obtained from instruments
affecting direct costs.
29This is the case because in the sample analyzed, virtually everyone has at least 7 years of
schooling.
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raised by both parents). However, the utility of work (the log wage rate) is not a
function of the parents’ background variables, after conditioning on schooling.30
Unobserved heterogeneity has two dimensions: heterogeneity in school ability
(taste for schooling), and heterogeneity in market ability. They assume that there
are K types of individuals and that each type is endowed with a pair of school
and market abilities (ω¯ki , ηi) for k = 1, 2...K and set K = 6. The distribution
of unobserved ability is orthogonal to parents’ background by construction and
should be understood as a measure of unobserved ability remaining after condi-
tioning on parents human capital. Note that schooling choices are modeled from
grade seven onward, so they do not really need to take into account endogenous
initial conditions.
The correlation between ability in school and ability in the market, Corr(ω¯ki , ηi),
is found to be very high (0.95). In order to evaluate potential ability bias, type
specific simulations of schooling decisions and wage histories are performed. The
correlation between unobserved market ability and realized schooling is equal
to 0.28. Orthogonality between market ability and realized schooling is therefore
strongly rejected. This provides evidence in favor of the existence of a strong pos-
itive ability bias although the correlation is technically speaking not a structural
estimate of the OLS bias.
The estimates of the Mincerian wage regression indicate that marginal returns
are generally increasing with the level of schooling up to grade 14. Local returns to
college training are substantially higher than the returns to high-school education.
Indeed, schooling has practically no value until grade 12. Until grade 10, the local
return is below 1% per year (0.4%). It increases to 1.2% in grade 11 and to 3.7%
in grade 12. Beyond high school graduation, the local return starts to increase
substantially. The local return increases to 6.0% in grade 13 and 12.7% in grade
14. After a drop at grade 15 (the local return is around 10.7%), the return to grade
16 increases to 12.2%. In subsequent years (corresponding to graduate training),
local returns are estimated to be 8.8% per year. Until college graduation and
contrary to what had been often postulated, the log wage regression equation is
generally convex in schooling.
These returns to schooling are relatively low. BH explain this result by the
presence of large differences in local returns between various grade levels. OLS
and linear IV estimates (measuring an average log wage increment per year of
schooling) tend to be biased toward the local returns at schooling attainments
that are the most common in the sample data. The results illustrate the distor-
tions introduced in a model built on the assumption that local returns to school-
ing are constant. These distortions co-exist with classical ability bias. It is also
noted that structural estimates do not require the form of separability between
30In a companion paper (Belzil and Hansen, 2003), this assumption is relaxed. The au-
thors find that parents’ background variables explain most of the cross-sectional variations in
schooling attainments but that individual differences in wages are mostly explained by ability
endowments orthogonal to family background.
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schooling and individual specific endowments which is needed in IV estimation.
It is possible to draw a parallel between these estimates and those reported
in Keane and Wolpin (1997). The high degree of convexity reported in BH 2002
may be a reflection of the higher returns to education in white collar occupations
(requiring a high level of schooling) than in blue collar jobs (requiring a lower
level of schooling).
Aside from the estimates reported, the main contribution of the authors is
to show that SSDP models may not only be used for estimating deep structural
parameters and simulating counterfactual policy experiments, but may also be
viewed as a substitute for linear IV estimation methods which impose a form of
separability between the effect of the instrument and the error term in the first
stage regression.31
6.5 Belzil and Hansen (2006): The Correlated Random
Coefficient Model
Belzil and Hansen (2006) investigate the properties of the popular correlated
random coefficient wage regression model which has attracted much attention in
the treatment effect literature. The starting point of the paper is the following
log wage function received by individual i, at time t, which is given by
log Wit = ϕi1 · Sit + ϕ21 · Expit + ϕ22 · Exp
2
it + ηi (26)
The authors use a model similar to the one found in their 2002 paper and
show that the estimates of the dynamic programming model with a rich hetero-
geneity specification, may be used to obtain all treatment effects proposed in the
microeconometric literature; the average treatment effects (ATE), the average
treatment effects for the treated and the untreated (ATT/ATU), the marginal
treatment effects (MTE) and, finally, the local average treatment effects (LATE).
Unlike the standard Late parameters estimated using IV techniques, their esti-
mates are obtained without relying on any form of separability between individual
heterogeneity and schooling. To evaluate the LATE, BH simulate a mandatory
high-school graduation (grade 12) policy and an increase in the utility of attend-
ing school during college. Using ex-ante and ex-post simulated schooling and
wage histories, they identify those individuals affected by each specific interven-
tion, and estimate the specific LATE parameter.
BH find support for the validity of the CRCWRM as returns to schooling are
subject to a high degree of dispersion across individuals (types). Interestingly, low
wage returns are compatible with the occurrence of very high returns to schooling
in some subpopulations (the highest type specific return is 0.14 while the lowest
is around 0.01). The importance of selectivity based on individual specific returns
31This point is developed further in Belzil and Hansen (2006) and is also central to the recent
literature on instrumental variables.
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to schooling is illustrated by the difference between the average returns for those
who are predicted to stop before college (0.051) and those predicted to attend
college (0.10). The estimates therefore conform to the intuition. The ATE (the
average return in the population) is equal to 0.0573. It therefore lies between the
ATU and the ATT.
The LATE estimates also conform to intuition. The estimates are found to
be highly instrument dependent. The LATE for the minimum grade attainment
experiment (0.051) is found to be lower than the LATE obtained for the college
attendance subsidy (0.10). As we show, the variation across experiment is easily
explained by the variation in the density of the sub-population affected by each
experiment.
The structural dynamic programming model with multi-dimensional hetero-
geneity is therefore capable of explaining the coexistence of relatively low re-
turns to education (on average) with very high returns for some identified sub-
populations and, in particular, capable of identifying the characteristics of those
individuals who would react to a counterfactual experiment.
6.6 Eckstein and Wolpin (1999): High-School Drop Out
Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) present a structural model of high-school attendance,
work and academic performance. This article does not focus on the return to
schooling. Indeed, post high school graduation is not modeled explicitly and
there is no reliance on Mincerian wage regressions. However, despite a high level
of complexity, the model investigated by EW offers a relatively clear picture of
the role of comparative advantages in school/work decisions. For this reason, it
deserves some attention.
The model is structured as follows. Young individuals receive both part-time
and full-time wage offers which depend on their ability endowment. Their ability
endowment is itself correlated with their ability affecting school performance and
the consumption value of attending school. Working reduces school performance
as well as leisure time, which is also valued by young individuals. The model is
estimated using data from the NLSY 79. The sample is smaller than the one
analyzed in Keane and Wolpin (1997) because the authors only consider young
males who were less than 15 on October 1, 1977.
EW stress four main questions. Who drops out of high-school? Why do
youths drop out? Does working while attending school affects school perfor-
mance? Would restrictions on employment affect the drop-out rate? The like-
lihood function (simulated) is the joint probability of school attainment, work
hours (discretized), wages, credits and grades (school performance). As in Keane
and Wolpin (1997), all heterogeneity is regarded as unobserved, and it is assumed
that the population is represented by four types.
The results indicate that working while in school reduces academic perfor-
mance, although the effect is small. The school drop out decision is typically
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explained by at least one of the following attributes: a low school ability (or low
motivation), high ability at wages that do not require high school graduation,
high value of leisure or low attached value to high school graduation. Altogether,
these results imply that policies aimed at forcing young individuals to stay in
school will not be effective at increasing graduation rates.
Overall, the rich heterogeneity components allowed in EW illustrates the no-
tion of comparative advantages that hides behind the positive correlation between
market ability and taste for schooling reported in Belzil and Hansen (2002). It
also sheds light on the reasons behind the ineffectiveness of tuition subsidies for
those of low ability in the population, reported in Keane and Wolpin (1997).
6.7 Magnac and Thesmar (2002,b): Cohort Effects in
Schooling Attainments
Magnac and Thesmar (2002,b) estimate a dynamic schooling model which does
not require the solution (or the approximation) of value functions. Their empirical
analysis is based on a set of moment conditions derived from a companion paper in
which they analyze the degree of under-identification of dynamic discrete choices
(Magnac and Thesmar, 2002,a). They use the fact that there is a one-to-one
mapping between value functions and choice probabilities; a fundamental result
found in Hotz and Miller (1993). Their constructive identification proofs suggest a
simple estimation method.32 In their empirical application, Magnac and Thesmar
investigate three competing explanations for the increase in schooling attainment
observed between 1980 and 1993 in France. These factors are an increase in the
return to education, a decrease in the direct and psychic costs of schooling and a
decrease in academic requirements (an increase in the success probability given
enrolment).
The model is set up as a standard optimal stopping problem and is estimated
from data taken from the “Enquete Formation Qualification professionnelle” per-
formed in 1993 by INSEE. They focus on cohorts of individuals born between 1963
and 1973. MT show that flexible regression methods may be applied to the sam-
ple analog of the net gain of staying in school for one period, and may be used to
resolve all questions mentioned above. An interesting finding is that, in France,
the increase in attainment is most likely explained by a decrease in academic
selectivity.
32More precisely, the method develop by Magnac and Thesmar (2002,a) uses the fact that
value functions, after suitable normalization, are functions of choice probabilities only. It is
therefore simpler than the method proposed by Hotz and Miller (1993).
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6.8 Cohen-Goldner and Eckstein (2002 and 2004): Train-
ing and Occupation Choices
In two companion papers, Cohen-Goldner and Eckstein (2002, 2004) analyze
the behavior of male and female immigrants newly arrived from the former So-
viet union and who choose between working and attending government provided
training courses. Although the authors are not concerned with schooling per
se (schooling obtained in the Soviet Union is assumed to be pre-determined),
government provided training may still be viewed as a form of general skill.
As in Keane and Wolpin (1997), the agent has a choice between working in a
blue-collar job or a white collar job. In both papers, the authors assume that the
job offer rate and the labor market wage depend on the occupation as well as a
participation in training. This constitutes a more general framework to evaluate
publicly provided training programs than those which are typically found in the
evaluation literature.
As the papers are similarly structured, I first summarize the 2004 paper, which
focuses on female immigrants. At the end, I will briefly state the findings of the
2002 paper. The data is based on a set of retrospective surveys conducted between
1992 and 1995. The surveys targeted immigrants from the former Soviet Union
who came to Israel between 1989 and 1992. As schooling has been completed
before the migration option was actually feasible, it is treated as pre-determined.
The offered wage in occupation j follows a Mincerian wage function, that is
log Wjt = ϕj1·Si+ϕ2j ·K1,t−1+ϕ3j ·K
2
1,t−1+ϕ4j ·K2,t−1+ϕ4j ·K
2
2,t−1+ϕ6j ·DTt (27)
where Kj,t−1 is actual work experience accumulated in occupation j and DTt is
an indicator equal to 1 if the individual has completed a training program by
date t, and 0 if not. The offer probability is also occupation specific and depends
on the training indicator.
The individual benefit from the availability of training is measured in this
study by the increase in expected lifetime utility, which consists of the effect of
training on employment, wages and preferences. As the authors use quarterly
data, they model the first 20 quarters specifically and approximate the terminal
value function (in quarter 21) by a linear function.
The results indicate that both schooling and experience imported from the
country of origin have no effect on wages. However, an additional year of white
collar experience raises white collar wages by 3.9% and blue collar wages by
2.7%. The return to blue collar experience is negligible in both sectors. More
importantly, they find that the return to local training is high. More precisely,
the wage return to training is almost 20% in white collar occupations but it is not
statistically different from zero in blue collar occupations. The authors also find
that training has a positive impact on job offer probabilities in both occupations.
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However, the impact is much stronger on white collar job offers. Overall, the
results suggest that training reduces unemployment substantially.
The authors conclude by performing policy experiments such as reducing and
increasing training availability. This is achieved by lowering or increasing the
probability of finding a training opportunity. They conclude that, unlike findings
in the classical evaluation literature, the social and private gain to training is
large. This holds despite the virtually null effect that training has on blue collar
wages.
Finally, in Cohen-Goldner and Eckstein (2002), a similar model is fit to the
male counterpart sample. The fundamental behavior of male immigrants and
female immigrants does not appear different. Unlike in the paper devoted to
female immigrants, the authors are able to fit the dynamic programming model
for two types of individuals. The results are quite similar, although the return
to white collar experience and white collar vocational training (0.15 and 0.10
respectively) are higher. Fundamentally, as for female immigrants, a positive
effect of vocational training is only found for white collar occupations.
The contribution of Cohen-Goldner and Eckstein goes beyond the structural
literature per se. Indeed, ϕ6j constitutes one of the most investigated parameters
in the “treatment effect” literature. This is particularly true when the effect of
training is allowed to be individual specific. The SSDP approach proposed by
Cohen-Goldner and Eckstein may be viewed as an alternative estimation method
to the popular treatment effect models common in the empirical literature. The
key difference is that their model is set in a dynamic setting and considers mul-
tiple ways in which training may affect labor market outcomes; namely wages,
employment (job search outcomes) and timing of re-employment. These findings
are fully consistent with the existing literature. Indeed, in the training litera-
ture, it is customary to report very low estimates for the effects of training on
wages (Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999). That is, the effect of training on
the mean wage offer for less advantaged workers is close to zero. However, it has
been recognized that training may significantly affect the employment probability
(Ham and Lalonde, 1996).
7 General Equilibrium Models of Schooling
7.1 The Structure of the Labor Market: General vs Par-
tial Equilibrium
In the literature, the partial equilibrium approach has been favored in most em-
pirical applications. To understand the key implications of the choice between a
partial and a general equilibrium setting, it is useful to re-examine equation (1).
In a partial equilibrium setting, the skill unit price is subsumed in the intercept
term. In a general equilibrium framework, changes in wages are decomposed into
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changes in skill price and changes in skill levels.33 The change in skill price is typ-
ically identified though movements in aggregate measures of some (or all) inputs
relevant in the production process. These may include changes in cohort sizes
or changes in physical capital. Until now, the authors concerned with general
equilibrium inference have only considered time series changes in skill prices but
have always implicitly assumed stationarity in the skill production function.34
7.2 Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998): Post Schooling
Human Capital and Inequality
Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) is the first general equilibrium model with
endogenous schooling. As Keane and Wolpin (1997), Heckman, Lochner and
Taber (HLT) set their model in a multi-skill environment. Actually, the model
allows for two skills, but skills are associated with schooling level (high school
graduates and college graduates) as opposed to occupation (Keane and Wolpin,
1997).
It is convenient to think about HLT as a two-period model. Individual school-
ing decisions are made in period 1. The choice is to attend college or not and it is
affected by a random shock. In turn, this choice dictates the sector in which an
individual will be working. Subsequently, on-the-job training and saving decisions
are made (deterministically) for the remaining periods.
The human capital production function chosen by HLT is more general than
most of those used in the literature. There exists a skill specific function for each
school level. The return to schooling therefore varies with age (as post schooling
human capital is accumulated) and cannot be summarized in a single parameter.
As a matter of fact, the model does not belong to the class of linear separable
models in which the returns to experience is independent of schooling.
The wage rate is the product of the skill rental price and the amount of
skill devoted to their current employment, after removing the current fraction
of the period devoted to on-the-job training. There is a key difference between
a general equilibrium model and a partial equilibrium model: the returns to
schooling depend on how many other people go to college, since the wage rate
decreases with school attendance. In partial equilibrium, this is ignored.
HLT pay particular attention to the effect of a simulated change in tuition
policies on college enrollment, a topic beyond the scope of this survey.35 A notable
difference between HLT and the rest of the papers in the literature is the modeling
of post schooling human capital accumulation. As opposed to models where
33Multiple skill models are developed in Willis (1986) and Heckman and Sedlacek (1985).
34To my knowledge, the time series properties of the human capital production function
has not been investigated in conjunction with the well documented recent increase in wage
inequality. For a discussion of several empirical issues in the wage inequality literature, see
Lemieux (2004).
35For a survey of the literture concerned with tuition policies, see Wolpin (2000).
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experience is only modeled through the decision to work or not (say like Keane
and Wolpin, 1997), the portion of time endowment spent on on-the-job training
activities is decided by the workers.
In HLT, there is no unobserved heterogeneity. Difference in skills/motivation
are measured by AFQT scores. As the authors assume the existence of a spe-
cific human capital production function for each schooling level, wages are not
represented by a classical wage regression function with separability. Schooling
facilitates on-the-job training and the return to schooling changes with age.
As stated before, the returns to schooling reported in HLT are not directly
comparable to those found in a Mincerian wage regression. The returns are age
specific and take into account the causal effect of schooling on training oppor-
tunities. In addition, their estimates are not computed for a marginal year but
for a high school/college graduate differential. When put back on a per-year ba-
sis, their estimates range between 8% per year and 17% per year. Given this,
these estimates are not particularly high. They are indeed compatible with those
reported in Belzil and Hansen (2002).36
7.3 Lee (2005): Cohort size, Occupation Choice andWages
Lee (2004) estimates a dynamic general equilibrium model of career decisions, in
the spirit of Keane and Wolpin (1997). Using CPS data on employment, cohort
size, schooling attainment and occupational choice, Lee investigates how cohort
size affects wages and how a counterfactual tuition policy change would affect
college enrollment. From the individual optimization side, his model is quite
close to Keane and Wolpin (1997). Basically, individuals make schooling and
occupational choices between age 16 and 65 based on the skill endowment at age
16 and on current as well as future skill prices. Lee focusses on two main skills;
blue collar and white collar occupations. However, skill prices are determined
endogenously in the market. They depend on the aggregate supply of white and
blue collar workers as well as on capital. The marginal product of each skill
is derived through an aggregate production function. In order to estimate the
model, he assumes that individuals have perfect foresight about future skill prices
As in Keane and Wolpin (1997), the wage regression is linear in schooling
and quadratic in accumulated experience and returns to schooling are estimated
as occupation specific. Given the complexity of the model, he assumes that his
population is composed of two types only. Aside from the general equilibrium
aspects, Lee also needs to approximate the value functions numerically, using
techniques which appear similar to those used in Keane and Wolpin (1997).
The main results are consistent with those reported above. First, he finds
a positive correlation between white collar skill and taste for schooling, but a
36In Belzil and Hansen (2002), the return to college education (4 years) averages 10.4% per
year of college.
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negative correlation between the blue collar skill and taste for schooling. As in
Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Belzil and Hansen (2002), relatively low returns to
schooling are found. The return to schooling in white collar occupations is 0.079
while it is equal to 0.048 for blue collar occupations. The return to experience
upon entrance in the market exceeds the return to schooling (it is 0.094 for white
collar experience and 0.022 for blue collar experience). The returns are quite close
to those obtained by Keane and Wolpin (1997), even though they are obtained
from a different data set.
Lee uses his model to investigate how the “Baby Bust” generation (born be-
tween 1930 and 1940) compared with the “Baby Boom” generation (born between
1950 and 1960), and investigate the sensitivity of college enrollments to college
tuition. He finds that those belonging to the “Baby Bust” generation faced higher
skill prices, attended college more and worked more than those belonging to the
“Baby Boom” generation. He also finds that a one percent increase in college
tuition would decrease college enrollments by 1.05%. General equilibrium effects
are found to be not so important.
7.4 Lee and Wolpin (2006): Intersectoral Mobility
Lee and Wolpin (2006) extend both Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Lee (2005)
to estimate a two-sector (goods and service) equilibrium model of endogenous
schooling, occupational and sectoral choices. As do Lee (2005) and Heckman,
Lochner and Taber (1998), they assume a competitive equilibrium model. The
model embeds both supply and demand features that may explain the secular
increase in service sector employment in the US.
The model includes an aggregate Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
production function for the goods and service sector with three skill types (white-,
pink-, and blue-collar occupations) and capital. The model is quite comprehen-
sive. It also includes both time-varying neutral and non-neutral technological
change and accounts for aggregate productivity shocks. Agents choose among
eight discrete alternatives: schooling, home production and any of the six sector-
occupations. In order to solve for the six different skill prices (which must equate
the marginal revenue product), the authors develop a reduced-form approxima-
tion of the rational expectation equilibrium.
To estimate the model, a method-of-moment estimation technique, as well
as data moments on employment (occupations and sectoral shares), wages and
schooling from the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1968 to 2001 and the
NLSY79, are used. As the model has a large number of parameters, it is difficult
to summarize. However, given the objective of this survey, it is important to recall
that both sectoral and occupation mobility costs are found to be very high. For
instance, the cost of moving from any occupation in the goods sector to the same
occupation in the service sector is close to $10,000 per year. Given the structure
of the model, the return to schooling is sector and occupation specific. Schooling
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increases white collar wages the most in both sectors, and given occupation, the
return to schooling is higher in the service sector. Overall, the returns are low
and comparable with those reported before.
7.5 A Brief Summary
After having reviewed a relatively large number of important contributions, it
is now informative to present a brief synthesis of the results. Table 1 summa-
rizes structural estimates of returns to schooling obtained in all models in which
schooling is endogenously determined. As seen earlier, in a linear setting, the
marginal effect of schooling on log wages lies between 4% and 7% per year of
schooling. Returns are also low when non-linearities are allowed, although local
returns during college average around 10% per year. However, when averaged
over the relevant range (from grade 7 to college graduation), the average is also
around 5%. These estimates are typically lower than their OLS counterpart, and
are therefore compatible with the existence of a positive ability bias.
As mentioned in the introduction, structural estimates are also much lower
than those reported in the experimental literature. To see this, a set of esti-
mates (along with their standard errors) reported in the experimental literature
is summarized in Table 2.37 These are representative of a large body of work
and include Angrist and Krueger (1991), Card (1995), Lemieux and Card (2000)
and Staiger and Stock (1997). For the most part, IV estimates reported in Table
2 exceed OLS estimates and are close to (or exceed) 10% per year. Except for
Lemieux and Card (obtained with Canadian data), these estimates have been
obtained with US data.38
37I report standard errors for IV estimates because they are known to be relatively imprecise.
Structural estimates, on the other hand, are typically very precise and are characterized by very
small standard errors.
38Card (1999 and 2001) provides an in-depth discussion of several of these papers and covers
other contributions as well.
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8 A Comparison of the IV and the Structural
Approaches
This section is devoted to a comparison of the structural and the IV (experimen-
tal) literature. In order to perform this comparison, it is useful to review those
aspects that are in common to both, but is also important to point out the main
attributes of the structural literature that distinguish it from the IV literature.
8.1 The Experimental Literature
As mentioned earlier, a large number of papers based on IV techniques have been
devoted to the estimation of returns to schooling. For a large part, the literature
is based on institutional features of the education system, or on “Natural Exper-
iments”. Card (1999 and 2001) presents an in-depth survey of the IV literature
devoted to returns to schooling and discusses the main conceptual issues within
a unifying theoretical structure (closely related to the Becker model) in which
individuals compare the benefits of schooling with the costs of schooling born
early in the life cycle.
At the outset, it must be understood that the Becker/Card model is funda-
mentally different from the dynamic models found in Keane and Wolpin (1997,
2001), or in many other contributions reviewed above. More precisely, the theo-
retical framework found in Card (2001) is fundamentally static in that it does not
consider the effect that schooling may have on post-schooling human capital ac-
cumulation opportunities (post-schooling wage growth is exogenous). Ultimately,
the relationship between wages and schooling is understood as a compensating
wage differential, emerging from individual differences in abilities and/or discount
rates.
In the dynamic (finite horizon) models of Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Belzil
and Hansen (2002), the opportunity cost of schooling also incorporates lost la-
bor market experience and forward looking agents may substitute experience for
schooling in order to magnify life cycle income. As we will see in more details
later, this means that exogenous events occurring before individual school com-
pletion may constitute useful statistical information, but may rarely be sufficient
to uncover the key economic parameters that characterize human capital accu-
mulation over the entire life cycle.
At the empirical level, Card (2001) reports that a large number of studies find
that IV estimates exceed OLS estimates by a wide margin and notes that the ten-
dency to obtain IV estimates, which exceed their corresponding OLS estimates,
has been observed in many different data sets and for many different countries.
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) present a survey of the economic literature using
natural experiments and focus their discussion on the implicit assumptions made
in the IV literature. They discuss the return to schooling and ability bias as a
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special case.
It is common to explain the OLS/IV discrepancy by the existence of potential
heterogeneity in returns to schooling.39 In the presence of heterogeneity in the
returns, IV estimates are inconsistent for the population average. Indeed, there
is a large econometric literature concerned with the interpretation of IV esti-
mates when slopes are individual specific. In the context of a correlated random
coefficient model, the IV estimator is sometimes referred to as a Local Average
Treatment Effect (LATE).40 Under certain conditions, the LATE parameter may
be viewed as an average return to schooling for the sub-population affected by
the experiment (the instrument), although the density of this sub-population is
not identifiable. It is often postulated that high returns are explained by the
fact that those individuals who are more likely to react to an exogenous policy
change are those who are at the margin of deciding to enter college before the pol-
icy change and that the same individuals have higher returns to schooling than
average. The difference between OLS and IV estimates is therefore explained
by the non-representativity of this particular sub-population. Ultimately, the
OLS-IV discrepancy is not incompatible with a positive ability bias.
8.2 Behavioral vs. Statistical Assumptions
Despite the existing split in the econometrics literature between those advocating
the IV approach and those who prefer structural analyses, it is useful to compare
the foundations underlying each approach and to recognize their commonalities.
Obviously, empirical work is impossible without some assumptions. For the
sake of the presentation, it is important to distinguish between two types of as-
sumptions: namely behavioral (primary) assumptions and statistical (secondary)
assumptions. Behavioral assumptions are those which link a particular empirical
model to economic theory. For example, some specific assumptions will dictate
whether the underlying model is consistent with static or dynamic (forward look-
ing) behavior, or whether an agent is behaving according to a rational expectation
hypothesis, or whether an agent faces uncertainty or not. Secondary assumptions,
on the other hand, belong to a later stage of econometric modeling and consist
of auxiliary statistical assumptions. In the contemporaneous econometric jargon,
these assumptions are often referred to as “functional form” assumptions.
In the IV literature, behavioral assumptions are explicitly stated by the desig-
nation of endogenous variables but are also implied by orthogonality conditions.
The orthogonality conditions indicate which variables, not directly part of the
model but part of the error term, are implicitly assumed to be exogenous. In the
structural literature, the behavioral assumptions are explicitly stated because
39Measurement error will be discussed briefly in Section 9. Recent surveys of the IV literature
do not seem to retain the measurement error explanation as an important one (see Heckman,
Lochner and Todd, 2005).
40See Imbens and Angrist (1994).
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the optimization problem, assumed to be solved by the agent, is also an input to
estimation.
Statistical assumptions are, for the most part, dictated by convenience and
rarely originate from economic theory. In the structural literature, such assump-
tions may include the parametric form of preferences and technology or the dis-
tribution of stochastic shocks.41 In the IV literature, the statistical assumptions
are those that characterize the outcome equation as well as the change in the
endogenous variable induced by the instrument.
As we will see below, the distinction between behavioral and statistical as-
sumptions may be a useful way to try to comprehend the distinctions between
both approaches.
8.3 What Distinguishes the Structural Literature from
the IV Literature?
As neither estimation method can be nested in the other, it is important to un-
derstand the key dimensions of the structural approach that distinguish it from
the more mainstream IV approach. These differences may be the key to under-
standing the reasons behind the diverging estimates of the return to schooling.
When trying to comprehend these discrepancies (in Section 9), it will be useful
to organize the discussion around these points.
To fix ideas, suppose one wishes to analyze the effect of a policy experiment,
which consists in implementing a college attendance subsidy. To grasp the fun-
damental differences between the two approaches, let’s consider the basic inputs
used by IV advocates and those used by structuralists, in this particular context.
The inputs of the structural analysis are i) the individual (per-period) pref-
erences, Uik(t, ωik, ε
k
it ), and ii) the law of motion, Ωi,t+1 = it(Ωit, dikt, ηi). To
refresh the reader’s memory, ωik and ηi are time invariant individual-specific taste
and ability, εtk is a state specific utility shock, dkt = 1 when k is chosen and 0 if
not, and Ωt defines the set containing all state variables known by the agent at
t. Most of the time it is assumed that Uik(t, ωik, ε
k
it) is linearly separable in ε
k
it.
Under some conditions that will ensure regularity of the problem, the sequential
probability of exercising choice k at date t is representable by a function Ψsitk(.),
such that
Pr(dikt = 1) = Ψ
s
itk(Ωit, ωi1, ...ωiK., ηi, β; ...) (28)
The superscript s stands for “structural” since an equivalent function will also
41Technically speaking, it is sometimes possible to use economic theory as an input to pref-
erence specification. For instance, a per-period utility of income has to be concave for a risk
averse agent.
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be introduced for the experimental analysis.42 Because the structural approach
usually allows for a large set of endogenous variables, the state specific duration
outcomes, Di(t), D2(t), ...DK(t), measuring accumulated periods spent in each
state as of date t, and defined as
Dk(t) =
t∑
j=1
dkj (29)
depend also on a large number of endogenous variables since Ωit depends on all
previous choices (the dik1, dik2, ...dikt−1) and on the realizations of the random
shocks εi1k,εi2k,...εit−1k.
To link structural analysis with a policy experiment, one has to recognize that
an“experiment” is representable by a change in one component of the determi-
nants of the individual choices (a state variable or a parameter). This parameter
(or variable) may belong either to U(), to t(.), or it may be one element of Ωt.
In a sequential setting, the change may affect a full sequence of parameters. In
the college attendance subsidy, it is natural to view the policy as creating an
increase in the net utility of attending college, or, alternatively as a decrease in
the cost of attending college between grade 13 and grade 1643 Let’s denote the
cost of schooling at by ω1 and suppress the calendar time for simplicity. Sup-
pose that the experiment boils down to changing ω1 by an infinitesimal amount,
and that Ψs(, ) is differentiable in ω1, then δPr(dik=1)
δω1
(like Ψs(.)) is not separa-
ble in the heterogeneity components (ωik, ηi). It is also important to note that
the recursive structure of the model imply that a change in ω1 entails a changes
in choice made prior to college enrollment through the option value (because of
the Rational expectation hypothesis) as well as changes in post-college choices
through the dynamic recursive structure.
In the IV literature, there are also two fundamental inputs; the outcome
equation and the first-stage regression model. However, the distinction between
parameters, state variables or other primitive quantities is not possible. The
starting point of the analysis is usually an ad hoc model of the desired level
of schooling (Dik(t) = S
∗
i ) . The econometrician typically assumes that there
exists some exogenous variable, say z1, which is one element of a potentially
larger set of variables Z, which captures the changes in the environment of the
individual. In most cases, it is assumed that the binary variable (z1) is sufficient
to characterize the change in the economic environment faced by the agent. To
perform the analysis, the researcher assumes that it is possible to decompose the
42The reader interested in the technical aspect of discrete dynamic programming may consult
Rust (1994), or Whittle (1982).
43In some very specific cases, for instance in a model with liquidity constraints, this policy
experiment may also entail a change in the discount factor. Note also that I am abstracting
from the very special experiment which would consist of imposing a dictatorial choice dkt.
Mandatory school attendance would fall in this category.
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relevant labor market history (schooling attainment) into the sum of a regression
component that typically depends only on the binary indicator (z1) and on an
orthogonal residual component. In practice, the underlying schooling decision
model may be represented by a single index model such as
Dik(t) = S
∗
i = Ψ
E(Zi, εi) (30)
where ΨE(.) is weakly separable in Z and ε (the error term), and where a form
of orthogonality between Z and ε must be maintained. The first stage of the
IV approach may therefore be seen as an approximation of Ψs(.). In practice,
it is also common to simplify the analysis by assuming that the relevant choice
is a single discrete decision (say, the decision to enter college or stop after high
school), in which case the equation for S∗ serves as a latent variable model that
generates the observed decision. Obviously, in such a case, the schooling decision
is reduced to a static (one shot) problem and the lack of allowance for multiple
schooling levels removes the sequential nature of the schooling decision.44
To obtain identification, z1 (and possibly other elements of Zi) must be ex-
cluded from the outcome equation. In the case where the outcome (wage) equa-
tion is not linear in the error term, a form of “monotonicity” must be assumed.45
Strictly speaking, the monotonicity condition implies that a change in the relevant
element of Zi must affect all individuals in the same direction. In the example of
the payment of a college attendance subsidy, z1 may be a binary indicator which
records exposure to the new policy. Effectively, when Z is a scalar, the analyst
must assume that it is sufficient to summarize all changes in the environment,
even if the changes affect a vector of parameters.46
At this stage, two important points should be emphasized. First, the re-
gression representation of the outcome equation used in the IV approach (30)
is only valid if there are no endogenous state variables that are allowed to vary
until school completion. In a general multi-state dynamic model, the conditional
mean schooling outcome would depend on other endogenous variables (perhaps
all of the Dk(t)
′s) and an exogenous change in a state variable (or a parameter)
would automatically create a change in some (or all) of these endogenous vari-
ables. The IV approach would then break down.47 In the context of the college
tuition example, this could arise if the decision to stay in school is affected by ac-
cumulated periods of employment, or by participation in part-time employment
while in school. Obviously, in a more restrictive theoretical setting, this condition
could be met. For instance, this may be the case in an optimal stopping model
44For internal consistency, the outcome equation (the wage function) has also to be modified
so to be consistent with a discrete outcome.
45The term “uniformity” is also occasionally used.
46The issue becomes even more complicated if one considers potential general equilibrium
effects.
47Some more specific examples are provided in Section 8.2.4.
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of schooling where endogenous work experience (or non market time) is never
accumulated before schooling is completed.48
Second, because the IV approach does not allow for a distinction between
unobserved heterogeneity (from the perspective of the econometrician) and ex-
ante risk (from the perspective of the agent), there is no correspondence between
the multi-dimensional random terms of the DP model and the scalar error term
of the IV approach.
To summarize, the distinction between the IV approach and the structural
approach may be coined in terms of a trade off between behavioral and statisti-
cal assumptions. Generally speaking, the structuralists design dynamic economic
models which allow for a relatively large set of endogenous variables, and rel-
atively general law of motions. To the extent that structural models allow for
more endogenous variables than do natural experiment analyses, the structural
approach is characterized by a smaller number of behavioral assumptions. How-
ever, this comes at the expense of a typically large set of statistical (secondary)
assumptions, which are needed in order to estimate any model in which sub-
jective probability distributions play a central part.49 On the other hand, most
experimentalists are concerned with only the first moment of both the outcome
equation and the endogenous (first stage) variable, and therefore make a smaller
number of parametric assumptions. However, because “natural experiments” are
scarce, most papers set in an IV framework consider only one endogenous vari-
able, and must therefore make a large number of behavioral assumptions. As seen
earlier, these assumptions take the form of orthogonality conditions and restrict
the class of models that are amenable to IV estimation to either static models or
to a very narrow class of dynamic models.
It is important to understand that, unless one has very specific knowledge of
the true data generating process, it is neither possible, nor sensible, to determine
which approach to estimation is more flexible. The class of models compati-
ble with each specific estimation approach is typically limited by behavioral and
statistical assumptions. For one thing, the economist does not really know the
dimensionality of the vector of endogenous variables (especially over the life cy-
cle). Further, the relative impact of the statistical and behavioral assumptions
made in each specific paper is usually the object of speculation, but not the ob-
ject of formal work. Put differently, it is virtually impossible to distinguish the
structural literature from the IV literature on the basis of their propensity to
make assumptions. It is rather by understanding the nature of their specific as-
sumptions that economists will move toward comprehension of the fundamental
48The exact conditions under which the regression function is well behaved would have to be
worked out on a case by case basis. It is not my intention to discuss general rules herein.
49I am abstracting from recent results found in Heckman and Navarro (2006) which show
how subjective probability distributions may be non-parametrically identified in a finite horizon
optimal stopping model.
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differences between the two approaches.50
8.3.1 Selectivity
By imposing an econometric structure in which young individuals make school-
ing decisions based on a set of parameters which includes their individual specific
market abilities (ωik, ηi), structural models offer an explicit specification of the
selectivity process or, at least, they provide the opportunities to quantify the
importance of selectivity through simulation methods. Put differently, in struc-
tural models, the individual specific ability term(s) inferred from lifecycle (panel)
data on post-schooling wages is (are) forced to be an input in the maximization
problem solved by the agent. When market ability enters the wage equation ad-
ditively and when individuals maximize lifetime income, the resulting selectivity
coincides with the celebrated notion of “ability bias” and the structural estimates
allows the econometrician to quantify directly the OLS bias.
In the IV literature, the selectivity process is viewed as being driven by nui-
sance parameters in which the analyst has no explicit interest.51 Indeed, esti-
mation does not specify anything about the information set of the agent when
schooling decisions are made. This, however, does not imply an absence of as-
sumption. As mentioned earlier, the separability/monotonicity assumption im-
plies that a change in the instrument must affect everyone in the same direction.
Heterogeneity in the effect of the instrument on schooling is therefore largely
conditioned by this property. In the extreme case where ΨE(.) is linear in the
instrument and every individual shares the same slope, the marginal effect of the
instrument is independent of all heterogeneity components and the implied mar-
ginal effect of the policy experiment must be identical for everyone. In the tuition
policy experiment, this is automatically violated. Indeed, in virtually all exper-
iments (mandatory schooling requirement, high school graduation subsidy,..etc),
homogeneity of the marginal effect would be violated. For instance, in a linear
probability first stage regression model, a common parameter for the effect of z1
is equivalent to the assumption that δPr(dik=1)
δω1
is independent from ωik and ηi. In
such a case, and unless the econometrician has access to variables that measure
all relevant skills, selectivity is ruled out.
8.3.2 The Specification of the Mincer Equation
In many papers surveyed above, estimates of the returns to schooling are obtained
from a more flexible specification of the Mincerian wage regression than the one
50Obviously, from a purely logistic (computational) perspective, the IV approach is much
easier to implement. It requires neither high-level econometric skills, nor advanced knowledge
of dynamic economic methods.
51This is why, at a somewhat anecdotal level, it is common to hear that the IV approach
does not require any “functional form” assumption.
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typically found in the experimental literature. In some cases, this flexibility refers
to the possibility that local returns to schooling vary with grade level. Structural
analysis allows the uncovering of all local returns [the functional form of ϕ1(.) in
equation (3)]. In other cases, it translates into an allowance for individual (or oc-
cupation) specific returns. If so, the researcher has also interest in characterizing
higher moments of returns to schooling.
In the experimental literature based on IV techniques, the effect of schooling
is linear by choice, or is implicitly linearized, and it is ultimately summarized in a
single parameter estimate. However, the linearity assumption is virtually always
rejected (Belzil and Hansen, 2002, 2003).52
8.3.3 Identification of the population Affected by Exogenous Changes
In the IV literature, the schooling decision is often specified as a static problem
or, at most, as a two period problem and it is customary to focus on college
attendance as the treatment of interest. If so, the individuals who would have
decided to attend college without exposure to the instrument (as well as those who
are not attending even after the implementation of the change) are identified as
those not affected by policy changes. In a fully dynamic setting, the issue is more
complicated. If one considers the college attendance subsidy (paid over 4 years
of college), the subsidy will not only affect those who would not have attended
college but also some of those who would have entered college even without
being exposed to the experiment by increasing their continuation (graduating)
probabilities. Equally, the subsidy may attract potential high school drop out
to graduate from high school. This implies that those affected by an exogenous
change in schooling costs are not only those who are at the margin of taking a
decision (say to attend college) but may also be those who would have gone to
college even in absence of the subsidy, but were affected though continuation (or
graduation) probabilities. This is also a major difference between the structural
approach and the IV approach.
8.3.4 Post Schooling Optimization and Orthogonality Conditions
In Section 8.2, I already mentioned the limitations of an IV model based on the
decomposition the endogenous variable into the sum of a regression component
that depends only on the experiment indicator and on an orthogonal residual.
I now focus on the outcome (log wage) equation. Although similar, the line of
argumentation will now be more precise. Obviously, in a static single-period
optimization problem with two endogenous variables and only one instrument
available, it is possible to include one of the endogenous variables in the error
term, as long as the instrument is orthogonal to the omitted endogenous variable.
In such a case, orthogonality requires a form of non-anticipation. When the
52This is more likely a consequence of the scarcity of true experiments.
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wage outcomes are measured after the effect of the instrument has set in, the
exclusion restrictions typically imply that a variable observed at one point in time
affects the choice that an individual made at that time, but does not affect future
outcomes. These conditions act as identifying conditions. However, in a dynamic
setting, the orthogonality between the instrument and the endogenous variable(s),
realized after the effect of the instrument is generally violated because the event
(the instrument) is part of the state variables observed by the individual.53 If so,
the exclusion restrictions are incompatible with a dynamic model specification.
This may be well illustrated by examining the treatment of labor market expe-
rience as a substitute for time spent in school, in order to achieve higher life cycle
wages. While most authors using IV techniques base their estimation strategy
on finding exogenous events (natural experiments) which are orthogonal to un-
observed ability, they rarely take into account that individuals keep optimizing
beyond school completion. This is surprising because labor market experience
(including learning on-the-job, training or job search) represents a key substitute
to schooling as a mean for enhancing life cycle wages and because inferences are
seldom drawn from entry wages. A survey of the IV literature reveals that practi-
cally no paper presents a joint estimation of returns to schooling and experience,
other than occasional inclusion of a control for age or for potential experience.
Yet, without controls for individual differences in accumulated post-schooling hu-
man capital, it is difficult to give an interpretation to the discrepancy between
OLS and IV estimates of the return to schooling.
To see this, consider the following simple framework (a slightly modified ver-
sion of (15)), where the wage equation is
wit = β0 + β1 · Sit + δ · PSHCit({dk =s,j}
t
j=1) + ηi + εit (31)
where PSHCit denotes an aggregate measure of all cumulated post schooling
human capital investment activities and where {dk =s,j}
t
j=1 is a vector representing
the sequence of discrete choices other than schooling (work, training, search or
learning) which have taken place by date t (when wages are measured).
To illustrate the nature of the models investigated by most of the authors
in the experimental literature, suppose that you wish to estimate a simplified
version of (31) using IV methods54, namely
wit = β0 + β1 · Sit + η
∗
it (32)
where
η∗it = δ · PSHCit + ηit. (33)
53Presumably, the period between the realization of the instrument and the measurement of
the wage outcome (namely s) may also be relevant in assessing the lack of orthogonality.
54The argument will work as well if you add an additional control for potential experience or
age (as is sometimes done) .
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Assume that you are given access to an instrument Zi. Typically, Zi refers to
the occurrence of an event that took place before t, say at t′, or, equivalently,
that the instrument comes into effect at time t′ (that is, each individual decides
to attend (or continue) school or at t′ based on the realized value of Zi). For
example, Zi may be season of birth, distance to college or change in mandatory
schooling age. Clearly, for this instrument to be a valid, it must be that
Corr(Zi, η
∗
it) = 0 (34)
which is a much stronger condition than Corr(Zi, ηi) = 0. However, in general,
(34) cannot be true since Zi is typically correlated with PSHCit by construction.
This may easily be demonstrated using some technicalities but it can be also
illustrated with more intuitive arguments.
In technical terms and in the context of the model presented in Section 4, the
issue is the following. First, consider a cross-section of wages measured at period
t = t′ + s, which represent one element of the state space at the beginning of
period t′ + s, denoted by ωwt′+s. The non-orthogonality is explained by the fact
that all elements of Ω(t′ + s), including ωwt′+s, are affected by Zi since the choices
made at t′ (the dkt′s) are affected by Zi (because Zi is an instrument). Therefore,
this also means that actions taken between t′ and t′ + s are also in principle
affected by Zi. From the recursive structure illustrated in (14), we get that
ωwt′+s(dk,t′+s−1,Ωt′+s−1)
dk,t′+s−1(Ωt′+s−1)
Ωt′+s−1(dk,t′+s−2,Ωt′+s−2)
....
dk,t′+1(Ωt′+1)
Ωt′+1(dk,t′ ,Ωt′\Zi, Zi)) (35)
This illustrates again that any element ωwt′+s may only be independent of Zi
after conditioning on Ωt′+s−1.
In most empirical applications, the researcher assumes that the effect of Zi
is limited to dkt′ only. However, realistically, η
∗
it is affected by the entire history
of d′kts from t′ to t
′ + s. This illustrates the differences between an IV strategy
set in an intertemporal context, where individuals optimize sequentially in every
periods, and one set in a standard static context.
An intuitive illustration may be provided in the context where the instrument
refers to season of birth or differences in birth outcomes (Angrist and Krueger,
1991) or distance to college (Card, 1995). Clearly, an individual who loses one
potential year of schooling may then react by investing in post-schooling training,
in search activities and/or in any other wage enhancing activities. Similarly, an
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individual willing to maximize lifetime income and who is born (or raised) far
away from the nearest college may also invest heavily in wage enhancing post-
schooling activities.
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) discuss similar issues in a variety of micro
economic models which are inherently dynamic and discuss the season of birth
example. They also point out that this criticism does not imply that experiments
are irrelevant pieces of information but rather that the multiplicity of instruments
required to estimate a sequential model may be a serious barrier to its estimation.
Obviously, this is not to say that structural models always take into ac-
count specific post-schooling investment activities. Indeed, many models re-
viewed above do not. However, to the extent that they all take into account
that schooling entails an opportunity cost in terms of work experience, they au-
tomatically capture some post-schooling endogeneity.
IV techniques, which have been introduced in econometrics more than sixty
years ago, were developed in a context were the immense majority of economists
could only envisage economic problems within a static (single period) framework.
Nowadays, it is difficult to say if the popularity of IV techniques is due to a
lack of interest of empirical labor economists in dynamic models, or is instead
due to the technical facility with which IV techniques may be implemented. It
is nevertheless interesting to note that the conceptual difficulty of introducing
instruments in a dynamic framework have been recognized for a long time in the
macro-econometric literature. 55
To a large extent, it is possible to view the structural literature on the return
to schooling as an alternative estimation method which allows the researcher to
get around many of the fundamental shortcomings and make progress on several
points when the experimental approach may not be conclusive. It is the key
differences between the structural and the experimental approaches that allow
the researchers to shed new perspectives on the estimation of returns to schooling
and the sign of the ability bias.
9 Why do Structural and IV Estimates of the
Return to Schooling Differ?
This is, of course, the natural question to ask at this stage. Explaining the
divergence between structural and IV estimates is largely complicated by the fact
that neither estimation method is directly nested within the other and because
IV estimates may not always constitute central location parameters. Finally,
IV methods typically provide a single point estimate for the return to schooling
55It should be pointed out that this particular issue arising in a dynamic setting has already
been noted in the dynamic rational expectation literature in the early 80’s. For a classic
example, see Hansen and Sargent (1982).
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whereas SSDP techniques may provide a single estimate, a grade specific estimate
or a population distribution, depending on the dimensionality of the heterogeneity
terms or on the degree of non-linearity incorporated in a particular model. As
a consequence, a formal answer cannot really be given. Nevertheless, I believe
that the fundamental differences between the structural and the IV approaches
(identified in Section 8) may now serve as a basis for understanding the differences
in corresponding estimates. Ultimately, I have grouped these potential reasons
into seven distinct sets.
9.1 The Possible Inconsistency of IV Estimates
As indicated in the previous section, the reliability of the experimental approach
may be questioned by virtue of the assumptions behind IV strategies. This is the
topic of much on-going research in theoretical econometrics, but it is certainly
not the focus of this paper. However, in order for this paper to be self-contained,
I present two main arguments; the consequences of using weak instruments and
the functional form restriction of the first stage regression.
9.1.1 Weak Instruments
First, IV techniques may be applied when the instrument is only weakly correlated
with schooling attainments (Staiger and Stock, 1997). Indeed, before the late 90’s,
most empirical researchers concentrated their efforts on finding an instrument
uncorrelated with neglected ability, but the power of the instrument chosen was
practically never investigated. In the presence of weak instruments, reported
estimates may be at best imprecise and, at worst, seriously inconsistent. The
large inconsistency is explained by the magnifying effect that the weak correlation
between the instrument and the endogenous variable may have on the possible
correlation between the instrument and the error term of the regression. As a
consequence, the validity of very high returns to schooling, reported in a simple
regression framework, may be seriously questioned.56
9.1.2 The Specification of the First Stage Model
As discussed in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), in the presence of heterogeneity
in slopes of the outcome equation, the specification of ΨE(.) is not innocuous.
The interpretation of the IV estimates depends crucially on a-priori assumptions
regarding ΨE(.). Intuitively, this may be seen by taking the probability limit
of the IV estimator obtained in a correlated random coefficient model. That
56Carneiro and Heckman (2003) present an in-depth analysis of various instruments used in
the literature.
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probability limit is function of the instrument (z), of the conditioning variables
(Z) and of the model that generates the discrete choice, namely ΨE(.).57
Basically, the IV approach may be deficient for three main reasons. First, as
illustrated in a multi-state dynamic (recursive) structure such as found in (33)-
(35), it is generally impossible to decompose schooling decisions into a regression
component that contains only a binary variable and an orthogonal component.
Second, when the true model generating the endogenous variable is marked
with multi-dimensional heterogeneity and contains a large number of state vari-
ables, the vector Zi must be sufficiently large to capture all the relevant vari-
ables that may proxy unobserved skills and market ability, as well as all the
relevant state variables affected by the policy experiment. If not, the model is
mis-specified. This also implies that the existence of the instrument is not suf-
ficient to decompose the first stage equation into a regression component that
depends solely on exogenous regressors and on an orthogonal error term.
Finally, as shown in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), when the separability (or
monotonicity) condition is violated, IV/LATE methods provide even inconsistent
estimates of the effect of the change in policy for those affected. In the cross-
section econometric literature, the violation of the monotonicity property is usu-
ally illustrated by the existence of “two-way flows” caused by the instrument.58
. For instance, the monotonicity property may be violated when the econometri-
cian is not controlling for a sufficiently large number of elements in the Z vector,
or when policy interventions entail general equilibrium effects. IV therefore relies
heavily on the first stage model specification. This is contrary to conventional
wisdom about the robustness of classical IV estimation to model mis-specification.
The separability (or monotonicity) restrictions are also at odds with a framework
where the outcome equation is parametrized so as to allow enough heterogene-
ity (a feature that is typically the motivation behind most empirical work based
on IV). The separability condition may be viewed as a statistical (or functional
form) assumption. It is in no way related to economic theory.59
Obviously, the fact that structural models depend on a-priori assumptions
is widely known. As noted earlier, once utility functions and distributions are
explicitly stated, the link between outcomes and state variables Ψsi (.) is automat-
ically specified. The key difference is that structural models allow to quantify the
importance of various sources of heterogeneity. Obviously, as for any non-linear
extremum estimator, structural estimates are generally inconsistent if the model
57This implies that changing the functional form of ΨE(.) (for a given Zi), may change the
interpretation of the IV estimate.
58Belzil and Hansen (2006) show that, in specific cases where an intervention may affect the
discount rate, this same intervention may also affect the schooling decisions of some individuals
in opposite directions.
59As far as I know, the representability result is due to Vytlacil (2002) and the monotonicity
condition (applied to IV) originates with Imbens and Angrist (1994). Several implications of
the monotonicity assumptions are discussed in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005).
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is mis-specified. In order to minimize the impact of distributional assumptions,
the structuralist has no other option than to use more flexible distributions.60
However, the fact that IV estimates are based on a a-priori assumptions is not
always recognized in the empirical literature. It is nevertheless important. IV
methods are often preferred to structural analyses on the ground that they are
said “to provide statistical analyses that are less prone to mis-specification”.61
As pointed out in the recent IV literature, this is only true in very specific cases,
where both the first stage and the outcome equations are linear (additive) in the
error term.62
9.2 Systematic Bias andMeasurement Error in Structural
Methods
It is also natural to search the intrinsic nature of the structural approach for a
systematic bias which could, for instance, lead to low returns to schooling. Such
a bias would arise, for instance, if one specifies schooling choices in a context
where the correlation between school and market ability is forced to be positive.
Assuming homogeneity in taste for schooling and/or in market ability would
most likely also have severe implications for the estimated return to schooling. A
survey of the structural papers in which an estimate of the ability bias is either
directly or indirectly available, indicates that all of them allow for the more able
to have a higher opportunity cost of schooling (conditional on taste for schooling),
and also allow for a free (flexible) correlation between the relevant heterogeneity
components. For that matter, none of the structural estimates presented herein
seem to be systematically biased toward a positive ability bias.
Similarly, the existence of potential (significant) measurement error, often
put forward as an explanation for the OLS-IV discrepancy, is very unlikely to
be a sufficient explanation. The measurement error argument often advanced to
explain the OLS-IV difference is typically set within a classical framework which
ignores the correlation between schooling levels and the measurement error itself
and also ignores the discrete nature of the schooling variable. Structural models
are intrinsically non-linear and the estimates are obtained from the solution of a
large number of moment conditions. Moreover, structural estimates are not only
lower than IV estimates, they are also much below OLS estimates. Indeed, the
distance between structural and the corresponding OLS estimates is typically
60See Heckman and Navarro (2006).
61This is discussed in details in Keane (2006).
62Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2005) present a good synthesis of the literature on IV and
explain several intrinsic weaknesses of the IV estimation strategies. Belzil and Hansen (2006)
present a characterization of several counterfactual experiments and show how the reactions
are correlated with individual specific returns to schooling. They also show that, in specific
cases where an intervention may affect the discount rate, this same intervention may also affect
the schooling decisions of some individuals in opposite directions.
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as large as the OLS/IV difference. Without real advances in the econometric
analysis of the impact of measurement error (non-standard) within non-linear
models, it is difficult to say more.63
9.3 The Rational Expectation Hypothesis
As structural estimates are obtained from panel data on choices and labor market
wages, they allow a distinction between individual persistent factors and random
shocks. However, all papers surveyed above assume that these factors are known
with certainty. This rather extreme form of Rational Expectation may not be
an innocuous assumption. It means, for instance, that high-wage workers (those
endowed with high market ability) automatically perceive a high opportunity cost
of attending school and this implies that high-wage workers attending school
must also be endowed with high academic ability. The degree of correlation
between abilities and schooling (ultimately driving the ability bias) may therefore
be affected by the assumption that abilities are known with certainty.
On the other hand, IV estimates, which are typically obtained from cross-
section data, ignore the distinction between permanent abilities and purely ran-
dom shocks, and do not require to assume a formal information set.64 This may
be an advantage of the IV approach, although the implication of the Rational
Expectation hypothesis remains unknown.
9.4 Liquidity Constraints
In his survey of the IV literature, Card (2001) postulates that one reason for
the existence of high IV estimates is the existence of liquidity constraints for a
subset of the population endowed with high returns to schooling. However, as
appealing as this interpretation may be, the incidence of liquidity constraints is
not identifiable unless one models borrowing constraints explicitly. Until now,
the structural literature has not found much evidence in favor of the existence
of liquidity constraints. This is the case in Keane and Wolpin (2001) as well as
in Cameron and Taber (2004). There may be several reasons for that, but one
explanation may be that many individuals have the option to attend college by
working while in school, or simply, choose colleges or universities that impose
lower tuition costs. Undoubtedly, this is a topic of research that will be popular
in a near future.
63The reader should remember that human capital literature in fundamentally plagued by
the curse of measurement error in that, human capital itself, cannot be observed. This is true
regardless of whether or not schooling is measured accurately.
64This form of Rational Expectations may also be avoided in a semi-structural framework,
where the schooling decision process is modeled as a reduced-form approximation to the se-
quential choices made by the individuals, and in which heterogeneity is allowed to be correlated
with market ability (wage fixed-effects). See Belzil (2006).
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9.5 Post-Schooling Dynamics and the Endogeneity of Post-
Schooling Human Capital Accumulation
Another explanation may simply be that the Mincerian wage regression incorpo-
rates too many endogenous variables and that the dimensionality of the vector of
instruments required is larger than the number of instruments actually available.
Put differently, it is the lack of control for the endogeneity of post-schooling work
experience that may be the cause of different estimates. However, as appealing
as this explanation may be, in the presence of a diversity of post-schooling op-
portunities such as training, search and learning, it is a difficult task to predict
the sign of the correlation between omitted post schooling wage growth and both
schooling and specific instruments.
To see the issue, it is convenient to consider the dynamic (recursive) structure
laid down in equations (31) to (35). Obviously, in the presence of post-schooling
dynamics, the sign of the OLS bias depends on the covariance between post-
schooling human capital investments (PSHCit) and schooling, as much as on the
covariance between schooling and unobserved ability. A related argument applies
to IV estimates. If economic policies that raise schooling also affect the costs
and/or the benefits of post-schooling human capital investments, the inconsis-
tency of IV becomes clear. For instance, when the covariance between PSHCit
and the instrument (Z) is positive, it is obvious that, for a given level of unob-
served market ability, IV over-estimates the true effect of schooling. As of now,
the importance of this type of bias is virtually unknown. Only further work will
clarify this issue.
9.6 The Functional Form of the Mincer Equation
When the effect of schooling on wages depends on the level of schooling itself, the
discrepancy is much easier to explain. When IV techniques are chosen, the log
wage regression is usually assumed to be linear in schooling. However, there is
no obvious reason to presume that the local returns to schooling are independent
of grade level. As individuals with a lower taste for schooling tend to stop school
earlier, OLS (or IV) estimates of the return to schooling, which impose equality
between local and average returns at all levels of schooling, will be strongly
affected by the relative frequencies of individuals with high and low taste for
schooling.65 More precisely, if there are large differences in local returns between
various grade levels, the OLS estimate (measuring an average log wage increment
per year of schooling) will tend to be biased toward the local returns at schooling
attainments which are most common in the sample data. As shown in Belzil
and Hansen (2002), this type of mis-specification is much more important than
the ability bias itself. In this case, the difference between the average return to
65This issue is sometimes referred to as the Discount Rate bias.
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schooling obtained from structural estimates and IV estimates is easily explained.
9.7 The Consideration of Psychic Costs
Finally, the simultaneous consideration of individual specific psychic costs and
wage returns, present in structural models, may also be a key reason for diverging
estimates. In the structural approach, observed wage differentials across schooling
levels are matched to actual choices by adjusting psychic costs estimates (for a
given rate of impatience). For example, high returns are only compatible with
decisions to leave school in the presence of non-trivial psychic costs. However,
and as seen earlier, structural estimates, which are low compare to IV estimates,
already imply a relatively important high-school/college premium (a relatively
high degree of convexity) or, perhaps equivalently, a high blue collar-white collar
premium. Assuming that psychic costs are prevalent in late high-school or in
college, matching optimal schooling decisions with actual choices, in the presence
of returns to schooling as high as 15% per year, would most likely require a much
more important role for psychic costs than what is currently found. In return,
this higher level of psychic costs would probably have to translate into a much
larger high-school/college premium than is seen in the data. 66
9.8 Summary
In summary, it is probably fair to say the discrepancy between structural and
IV estimates is primarily a reflection of the differences in the objects estimated
by the researchers. Classical IV methods have been developed in the context of
static regression models in which slopes are common to all individuals. They are
ill equipped for estimating population averages and they do not arise as a natural
estimation strategy when agents continually optimize in a dynamic environment.
SSDP techniques, on the contrary, reflect the desire to model endogenous de-
cisions as well as outcomes for randomly sampled individuals. For this reason,
structural estimates are more naturally associated with classical measures of cen-
tral location. The evidence reviewed in this paper seems to suggest that point
estimates obtained within a structural framework are a better indicator of the
population average than IV estimates. Most structural estimates of the return
to schooling are also smaller than their OLS counterparts and, therefore, imply
that OLS estimates probably over-estimate the population average return. In a
certain sense, structural estimation has revived interest in the notion of “ability
bias” and has brought new credibility to the classical hypothesis, that the ob-
66A similar issue arises when considering risk aversion. Given schooling costs (tuition plus
psychic costs), a rate of return of 15% would require either a much higher degree of risk aversion
than is found in the data, or equivalently, a huge level of risk associated with schooling. See
Belzil and Leonardi (2006) for a discussion.
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served correlation between wages and schooling is an over-estimate of the true
causal effect of schooling on wages.
10 Conclusion and Avenues for Future Research
In the applied labor economics profession, it is common to hear the claim that
structural models are only useful for estimating “deep structural parameters”.
This common belief is at best only partially true, at worst completely misguided.
As indicated by the content of the papers reviewed in this survey, the structural
approach is also a powerful instrument for estimating outcome equations when the
econometrician feels that the maintained hypotheses required for IV estimation
are undesirable.67
Obviously, there are several areas in which the structural literature is likely to
make progress in a near future. First, and as stated earlier, structural models are
typically formulated within a Rational Expectation framework, and in particular,
estimated under the maintained hypothesis that persistent unobserved (to the
econometrician) heterogeneity is in the information set of the agent from the
start of the optimization process. Whether this is a valid assumption or not is
debatable. For instance, if heterogeneity identified from post-schooling data is
partly explained by firm heterogeneity, this assumption becomes quite unrealistic.
It would be interesting to develop an estimation framework which allows for
gradual learning about academic and, in particular, labor market skills.68
Second, despite the fact that most individuals spend a much larger share of
their productive life in the market than in school, the structural literature (just
like the experimental literature) has focused on the endogeneity of schooling.
When treated as endogenous, work experience is modeled through occupation
choices or as a simple discrete choice. There are no compelling reasons to do so.
Little is known about the relationship between schooling and the intensity of post-
schooling human capital accumulation (including on-the-job training decisions as
well as work intensity). This may also help understanding the accuracy of IV
estimates that entail orthogonality conditions between an instrument and error
terms realized at a later stage.
Third, the role of search frictions on both schooling and training decisions
remains largely hypothetical. At the empirical level, those who have modeled hu-
man capital accumulation within a search framework have conditioned on school-
ing attainment and the effect of wage dispersion and schooling decisions has been
completely ignored. Indeed, it is well known that the distinction between offered
and accepted wages is relevant and may affect both the estimate of the return to
schooling and experience.
67Interestingly, very few structural papers appear to focus on the estimation of parameters
such as the degree of risk aversion or the rate of time preference.
68This issue is discussed in Cunha, Heckman and Navarro (2005).
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Finally, despite the general focus put on human capital theory, it is relatively
well known that lifecycle wage growth may be partly disconnected from produc-
tivity growth. In the presence of incentive based employment contracts, just like
in the case of search frictions, the interpretation given to post schooling wage
growth becomes problematic (Lazear, 1997). It would be interesting to inves-
tigate how schooling decisions are made when promotions and human capital
accumulation are alternative methods to enhance life cycle income.
Off course, there are no reasons why these topics should be investigated solely
by structuralists. Each of these questions is interesting in its own right and,
indeed, structural estimation is often viewed as controversial in empirical labor
economics.69 However, a realistic representation of the human capital accumu-
lation process must recognize that skills may be enhanced by a wide variety of
different tasks and that individuals are constantly faced with investment or search
opportunities over their life cycle. This means that exogenous events occurring
at one particular point in time will rarely be sufficient to uncover the key eco-
nomic parameters that characterize human capital accumulation over the entire
life cycle. For this reason, the structural approach should be seen as a key tool
for understanding skill formation behavior and for performing relevant policy
evaluations.
In conclusion, the measurement of the return to schooling remains an open
question. The split between those advocating structural analyses and those ad-
vocating the use of IV techniques is a sheer indication of the lack of agreement
on the best way to proceed. However, and in light of the recent literature, which
has documented a clear increase in the OLS estimate of the return to schooling
in conjunction with recent technological changes, it is more than ever important
to obtain a reliable measure of this parameter.
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Table 1
Returns to schooling in StructuralModels
with Endogenous Schooling
Sample return to
schooling
Keane and Wolpin (1997) blue collars (white males) 0.024
white collars(white males) 0.070
military (white males) 0.058
Keane and Wolpin (2000) blue collars (white males) 0.071
white collars(white males) 0.020
Keane and Wolpin (2001) white males 0.075
Belzil and Hansen (2002) in high school (males) 0.007
in college(males) 0.104
average (males)* 0.046
Lee (2005) blue collar (males/Females) 0.048
white colar(males/Females) 0.079
Belzil and Hansen (2006) (type 1, males) 0.0189
(type 2, males) 0.1387
(type 3, males) 0.0732
(type 4, males) 0.0732
(type 5, males) 0.0154
(type 6, males) 0.0264
Lee and Wolpin (2006) blue collars/goods 0.027
blue collars/service 0.044
white collars/goods 0.054
white collars/service 0.076
Pink collars/goods 0.046
pink collars/service 0.047
*The average refers to the average taken from grade 6 to grade 16.
** The average refers to the population average (over all types) of a linear
effect of schooling on wages.
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Table 2
Some Estimates of the Return to Schooling
in the Experimental literature
Sample Parameter
(std. error)
OLS IV
Angrist and 1970-80,US Census
Krueger (1991)
1920-29 cohort 0.070 0.101
(0.000) 0.033)
1930-39 cohort 0.063 0.060
(0.000) (0.030)
1940-49 cohort 0.052 0.078
(0.000) 0.039)
Card (1995) NLS young Men,1966 cohort 0.073 0.132
(0.004) (0.05)
Lemiex and 1971/81 Canadian Census 0.070 0.164
Card (2000) (0.002) (0.053)
Stock and 1980 US Census men
Staiger (1997)
1930-39 cohort 0.063 0.098
(0.000) (0.015)
1940-49 cohort 0.052 0.088
(0.000) (0.015)
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